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In 1976, Americans elected Jimmy Carter on a promise of arms control and a reduced role for 
nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy. While Carter remained committed to arms control, he 
ultimately strengthened the damage limitation strategy laid out in the Nixon administration, 
pushing the U.S. toward nuclear modernization and an increased reliance on nuclear 
weapons.  Why did the Carter administration adopt this strategy necessitating nuclear 
superiority?  Using qualitative analysis of newspapers, private memos, and public government 
documents, I find conventional explanations of Carter’s policy downplay the prominent domestic 
debates about nuclear strategy during this time.  Drawing on theories of agenda setting and 
legitimation in national security, I argue Carter shifted his strategy partly because coalitions 
legitimated alternative policies and successfully mobilized against his initial vision.  The tension 
between weapons modernization and arms control pervades the development of U.S. nuclear 
policy; this work suggests contradictions in U.S. nuclear strategy reflect contestation between 
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On January 20, 1977, Jimmy Carter pledged to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in 
United States military strategy, vowing, “We will move this year a step toward our ultimate 
goal––the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth.”1 Carter distinguished himself 
from previous Cold War Presidents with his forceful and public commitment to disarmament. He 
continued negotiating the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, the 
first major bilateral arms limitation between the two great powers.  Carter successfully signed the 
second round of this agreement, SALT II, in 1979.  Further, Carter assumed office during the 
period of strategic parity, or equivalence in U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities, and during a 
period of détente, or warming of U.S.-Soviet relations.  Based on Carter’s well-known distaste 
for nuclear weapons, many expected him to seize this moment of parity as an opportunity to 
adjust the U.S. nuclear strategy to rely on fewer nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet attack. 
Contrary to these expectations, however, Carter began a series of adjustments in military 
strategy that required nuclear modernization and even acquisition, increasing the role of nuclear 
weapons in defense strategy.  The Richard Nixon administration had laid out a nuclear strategy 
relying on a nuclear arsenal capable of matching any level of nuclear exchange against Soviet 
military targets, and Carter embraced and strengthened this strategy.  Although Carter canceled 
the production of the B-1 bomber, he approved the development of two new missiles, the 
submarine-launched Trident II and the land-based Missile Experimental (MX).  In 1980, Carter 
signed Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), which presented a countervailing strategy emphasizing 
attacks on Soviet leadership or military targets and the ability to deny Soviet victory at any level 
of nuclear war.  This doctrine committed the U.S. to seeking nuclear superiority not only on an 
                                                
1 Jimmy Carter, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1977, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6575. 





operational level, through an offensive strategy requiring significant weapons modernization and 
acquisition, but also on a declaratory level, through rhetoric affirming nuclear weapons’ role in 
denying Soviet dominance.  Despite Carter’s commitment to arms control, he adopted a strategy 
which undercut this goal––it embraced the need for arms buildups to ensure the flexibility and 
survivability of U.S. forces in a nuclear war. 
In this thesis, I seek to answer the following question: why did the Carter administration 
adopt this nuclear strategy necessitating nuclear superiority?  While this thesis focuses on an 
historical case study of the Carter administration, it has general applications to the study of the 
politics of nuclear strategy.  The disconnect between a President’s preference for arms control 
and the choice of nuclear strategy pervades American foreign policy, manifesting in virtually 
every administration since the invention of nuclear weapons.  After World War II, Truman was 
deeply disturbed by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and initially refused to conceive of 
the atomic bomb as “anything other than an apocalyptic terror weapon.”2  Through the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946, he placed the use of atomic weapons under the President’s sole authority, 
and he even flirted with the Baruch Plan, a plan to turn nuclear weapons over to international 
control and eventually eliminate them.  Yet by the end of Truman’s presidency, his 
administration had adopted a costly nuclear strategy of overkill, with two or three warheads 
assigned to a single target.3 
John F. Kennedy also demonstrated this same tension between an aversion to nuclear 
weapons and the adoption of costly nuclear strategy; in his initial briefing on his inherited 
nuclear strategy, he expressed horror at this policy of massive retaliation, a strategy of launching 
                                                
2 David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” 
International Security 7, no. 4 (1983): 11. See also Larry G. Gerber, “The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold 
War,” Diplomatic History 6, no. 1 (1982): 69–95. 





the entire nuclear arsenal immediately upon initiating war.4  Yet Kennedy’s own “flexible 
response” nuclear doctrine invested in a variety of weapons systems to develop multiple options 
in response to a Soviet attack.  Most recently, Barack Obama echoed Carter’s early sentiments in 
his 2009 speech in Prague, where he pledged to “seek the peace and security of a world without 
nuclear weapons,” and promised to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security 
strategy.5  In 2010, he successfully negotiated another round of arms control measures with 
Russia, known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).  At the same time, 
however, Obama remained deeply committed to the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 
Obama authorized expensive modernization programs for land-based missiles, submarine-
launched missiles, and strategic bombers––all three legs of the nuclear triad––which critics 
worried could provoke arms racing with other nuclear powers.6  My research on Carter’s arms 
control policy and nuclear strategy may provide some insight into why other Presidents 
demonstrated similar tensions between these aspects of their military strategy.  
To understand this apparent shift in Carter’s nuclear policy, this thesis will utilize a 
combination of archival documents, newspapers, and secondary sources, as well as qualitative 
text analysis.  It will trace Carter’s evolving nuclear strategy and the debates surrounding his 
policies over time.  I argue Carter’s shift in strategy can partially be explained as the result of 
Carter’s failure to legitimate his desired strategy to a domestic audience.  In both public and 
private settings, actors opposed to Carter’s vision legitimated policies calling for nuclear 
superiority by arguing their strategies would strengthen deterrence and allow the U.S. to 
maintain political leverage over the Soviet Union.  This rhetoric mobilized a domestic coalition 
                                                
4 Scott D. Sagan, “SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,” International Security 12, no. 1 
(1987): 22–51.  
5 Barack Obama, “Remarks in Prague,” April 5, 2009, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85963&st=prague&st1=. 
6 See, for example, William J. Broad and David Sanger, “As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, ‘Small’ Leaves 





against Carter; Carter and others could not silence this opposition without facing accusations of 
undermining deterrence, and Carter shifted his policy to accommodate this coalition. The next 
section provides an overview of the nuclear policies of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Carter, 
showing how Carter’s policy shifted to resemble that of his predecessors.  Then I evaluate 
existing explanations of Carter’s shift, arguing that accounts placing Carter in a group of 
policymakers pushing for nuclear superiority downplay his commitment to arms control and the 
lack of consensus about the necessity of superiority.  Accounts arguing that domestic opposition 
forced Carter’s shift highlight this lack of consensus, but they fail to explain the causes of 
successful domestic mobilization against Carter.  Next, I develop my theory explaining how 
legitimation allows groups to mobilize and compete with each other to dominate policy planning.  
Successful legitimation wins support for one coalition while silencing the opposition, giving the 
winning group the power to shift policy towards their more legitimate preferences.    
 
Nixon, Ford, and Carter: Nuclear Policy in the 1970s 
 Carter initially tried to distinguish his nuclear policy from that of Nixon and Ford, but by 
the end of his term, he had embraced and strengthened these policies.  This section will provide 
an overview of the trajectory of nuclear policy in the age of parity from Nixon to Carter. The 
Soviet Union had achieved strategic parity with the U.S. by the late 1960s, as 1965-1970 saw 
significant quantitative and qualitative improvements to Soviet nuclear forces.  Most notably, the 
Soviet ICBM force grew from 224 to 1220 in this period, and the new ICBMs had increased 
accuracy and carried multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), meaning each 
missile could carry several warheads each directed at a different target. At the same time, the 





raising U.S. allies’ concerns about extended deterrence.7  To meet these concerns, Nixon pressed 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to spend more on defense, and he began talks 
with the Soviet Union to reduce conventional forces in what would come to be called the Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions talks in 1973.8   
On the nuclear side, Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initiated the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), an attempt to encourage the Soviet Union to give up the 
“destabilizing” elements of its nuclear arsenal.  Nixon and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev 
signed the accords in 1972, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the “Interim 
Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.”9  The Senate generally accepted SALT, besides fierce 
opposition from Sen. Henry Jackson (D, WA). He criticized the agreement for not requiring 
equal numbers of weapons on both sides, attaching the “Jackson Amendment” to the treaty; this 
recommended future arms control be coupled with modernization to prevent U.S. “levels of 
intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union.”10 
Nevertheless, Ford began the next round of arms control talks, and Carter inherited ongoing 
negotiations for SALT II.   
At the same time, the Nixon and Ford administrations began increasing U.S. nuclear 
forces, especially after a series of nuclear posture reviews from 1972 to 1974.  These began with 
the Department of Defense’s National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy Review Panel, 
known as the Foster Panel, and National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 169, which were 
                                                
7 Brian Auten, Carter’s Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 2009), 44-46. 
8 These talks continued until February 1989, when they were renamed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe. “CFE Chronology: Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed 
March 13, 2018, https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/chron.htm. 
9 These will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  Office of the Historian, “Strategic Arms Limitations 
Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II,” United States Department of State, accessed March 3, 2018, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt. 
10 “Congress Approves SALT Offensive Arms Agreement,” in CQ Almanac 1972, 28th ed. (Washington, DC: 





formalized in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 in January 1974.  These 
studies concluded the U.S. needed more flexible targeting plans beyond the massive attack 
options in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) in order to control escalation in a 
nuclear exchange.  The Nixon administration examined Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) and 
Regional Nuclear Options (RNOs) focused on counterforce targeting—targeting military 
assets—to counter potential Soviet moves in Western Europe.11  To this end, Nixon initiated 
modernization and development programs for all three legs of the nuclear triad.  In 1973, the 
administration approved the B-1 strategic bomber, which could track and target military assets, 
take off quickly from bases, carry more nuclear weapons, and fly fast and low to avoid Soviet 
radar detection.  The bomber caused controversy as opponents preferred to modernize existing 
B-52 bombers—although Ford requested $1.9 billion for production of 244 B-1s, Congress 
delayed the production decision until February 1977.12 
The increased Soviet ICBM capabilities heightened concerns about U.S. ICBM 
survivability in a nuclear attack, so the Air Force wanted to improve the Minuteman ICBMs to 
reduce vulnerability and more effectively strike hardened military targets.  The U.S. began 
enhancing its MIRV capabilities by developing the more accurate MK-12A reentry vehicle and 
began plans for the MX, a more accurate, MIRVed, and potentially mobile ICBM to replace the 
aging Minuteman forces.13  In the submarine leg of the triad, the Nixon administration first 
updated its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with the Poseidon C3, a MIRVed 
missile capable of carrying 14 RVs.  After SALT II, Nixon approved the development of the new 
                                                
11 William Burr, “The Nixon Administration, the ‘Horror Strategy,’ and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 
1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 3 (July 19, 2005): 69-76. 
12 For the case for the B-1, see John F. McCarthy, “The Case for the B-1 Bomber,” International Security 1, no. 2 
(1976): 79-87.  For the case against the B-1, see Archie L. Wood, “Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force without 
Really Trying-a Case against the B-1,” International Security 1, no. 2 (1976): 102.   
13 Donald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge: 





Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and began developing both the Trident I C4 and 
Trident II D5 SLBMs.  These had greater range and accuracy, prompting some in Congress to 
deem Trident a “war-fighting” weapon; they cut funds for the Trident in 1975 and 1976.14  
Finally, Nixon began modernizing various theater nuclear forces (TNF), including the surface-to-
surface missiles Pershing IA and Lance.  These programs focused on improving accuracy, 
hoping to reduce collateral damage from strikes and therefore prevent escalation in limited 
nuclear targeting.15  Thus, by the time Carter assumed office, the U.S. had made significant 
progress on both arms control and major nuclear modernization programs. 
During Carter’s 1976 campaign, he championed arms control and criticized Ford’s 
defense spending, repeatedly promising to cut between $5 and $7 billion from Ford’s Fiscal Year 
(FY) 1978 defense budget of about $123 billion.16  Carter sought advice on military spending 
from the Brookings Institution, where consultants recommended cuts to the B-1, MX, and 
Trident programs, among others.17  Carter appeared to espouse a MAD strategy departing from 
the nuclear posture set in motion by Ford and Nixon.  He expressed skepticism of LNOs, saying, 
“Even if we could ensure that war would be kept ‘limited’ in nature, it would still face the 
prospect of approximately 10 million Americans being killed.”18  Emphasizing the value of 
assured retaliation, Carter declared SSBNs “the most important strategic element in the entire 
defense mechanism of our country” because of their invulnerability.19  Finally, he decried the 
logic of damage limitation, arguing, “There would be no possibility…that a first-strike capability 
                                                
14 Graham Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 146. 
15 Auten, Carter’s Conversion, 71-73. 
16 George C. Wilson, “Carter’s Pentagon Expected to Focus on Better Management,” The Washington Post, 
December 17, 1976; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “An Elusive Promise on Defense Spending,” The 
Washington Post, December 30, 1976. 
17 John D. Mini, “Forced Conversion: Civil-Military Relations and National Security Policy in the Carter 
Administration, 1977-1981” (Ph.D. diss., UNC-Chapel Hill, 2010), 43. 
18 The Presidential Campaign, 1976 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 355-358. 





could be adequate in preventing massive destruction on the country that originated the strike.”20  
By the time Carter entered office, he promised to make major changes to the U.S. nuclear 
program. 
Carter, however, entered office amid heated domestic debates about the current strategic 
environment of parity.  The Nixon and early Ford administrations had witnessed a general 
feeling of détente, or warming, or U.S.-Soviet relations, as seen in agreements such as SALT.  
By the end of Ford’s term, a group of alarmists who rejected détente had gained public visibility, 
most notably in the “Team A/Team B” exercise.  In 1974, University of Chicago professor 
Albert Wohlstetter believed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had systematically 
underestimated Soviet military capabilities in its annual National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).  
Together with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ACDA advisor Paul Wolfowitz, he 
persuaded Ford and the new CIA Director George H.W. Bush to set up an alternate inquiry to 
assess Soviet capabilities and intentions.21  Working through the President’s Intelligence 
Advisory Board, this “Team B,” led by Harvard professor Richard Pipes, included other 
hardliners like Paul Nitze.  Nitze had been involved in nuclear planning since the Truman 
administration; in 1957, he drafted the “Gaither Report,” known for creating perceptions of an 
illusory “missile gap” that prompted a major U.S. arms buildup.22  Team B found the Soviet 
Union did not adhere to MAD and believed it could win a nuclear war.  They also advanced the 
idea of the “window of vulnerability”: if the U.S. did not start re-arming, the Soviet Union would 
soon gain nuclear superiority.  Although many at the time disputed the accuracy of Team B’s 
findings and the final NIE still believed the U.S. and Soviet Union would remain in roughly 
                                                
20 The Presidential Campaign, 1976, 357. 
21 Anne Hessing Cahn, “Team B: The Trillion-Dollar Experiment,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 49 no. 3 (1993): 22, 
24; Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment 
(Boston: South End Press, 1983), 197-199. 





equal balance, it included some Team B assessments; the NIE revised its estimate of Soviet 
military spending to 10-15 percent of its Gross National Product from 6-8 percent.23  This Team 
A/Team B exercise leaked to the press during the transition, with the New York Times publishing 
Team B’s findings on December 26, 1977.  This unleashed debate about whether the Soviet 
Union accepted parity or sought superiority, as three Congressional committees called hearings 
about the findings.24  Meanwhile, the hawks of Team B gained public visibility in calls for the 
U.S. to increase the quantity and quality of its nuclear arsenal.  
Despite this vocal opposition, Carter upheld his campaign promises during his first year 
in office, cutting back the defense budget as well as nuclear weapons programs.  Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown presented a modified FY1978 defense budget of $120.3 billion to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on February 24, reducing Ford’s budget by about $3 billion.  
The budget cut funding for the nuclear Lance missile, the B-1, and the MX, along with other 
conventional programs.25  In particular, Carter expressed ambivalence about the future of the B-
1, refusing to make a firm decision but saying he had “serious questions about whether or not the 
B-1 should be…the center of our airborne defense capability.”26  Senate Majority Leader Robert 
Byrd (D, WV) urged Carter to cancel it, citing its enormous costs and how it would soon become 
vulnerable to improving Soviet radar technology.  At the same time, Pentagon studies and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended the B-1 as the best option to uphold this leg of the 
                                                
23 Cahn, “Team B,” 25.  See also Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate 11-3/8-76, ‘Soviet 
Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s’ (1976), 1-6.  Team B’s main objective seemed to be to 
push their own hardline agenda, and most of their findings turned out to be inaccurate.  See Joshua Rovner, Fixing 
the Facts: Nationals Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 113-114. 
24 David Binder, “3 Sets of Senate Hearings Expected On Soviet Might and Strategic Aims,” New York Times, 
January 8, 1977.  For other coverage see Murrey Marder, “Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet Intentions,” 
The Washington Post, January 2, 1977; Murrey Marder, “‘Worst-Case’ Intelligence Hit,” The Washington Post, 
January 19, 1977. 
25 George C. Wilson, “Carter Will Seek $2.7 Billion Cut In Defense Budget,” The Washington Post, February 20, 
1977. 






triad.27  While still controversial, the House voted to fund the B-1 on June 28 without a decision 
from Carter.28  Then, on July 1, Carter announced the B-1’s cancellation, only saying he believed 
the U.S. would still have “an effective an flexible strategic force whose capability is fully 
sufficient for our national defense” even without the B-1.29  Immediately after, Brown 
announced a major upgrade to the cruise missile to be fitted on existing B-52s, saving money 
while maintaining the effectiveness of the bomber force.30  At this point, Carter still seemed 
poised to advance his arms control agenda set forth in the campaign. 
Over time, Carter’s decisions contradicted his original goals.  Through 1978, he took 
other significant arms reduction measures by revising the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) negotiations, cutting funds for naval submarine building, choosing not to deploy 
the enhanced radiation warhead (“neutron bomb”) in Western Europe, and cutting funds for the 
Minuteman III ICBM.  His FY1979 Defense budget of $126 billion also generated disapproval 
from Pentagon officials who complained about his cuts to important programs, but Carter 
remained committed to his budget and even vetoed Congress’s higher budget proposal.31  By fall 
1979, Carter had signed a major arms control agreement in SALT II, but he had increased 
spending on other nuclear programs.  He encouraged NATO’s deployment of new theater 
nuclear forces (TNF), increased spending on Trident II, authorized construction of the MX and a 
new basing mode, improved command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) in 
                                                
27 Letter, Robert Byrd to President, 6/23/77, NSA 7 – Subject File, “B-1: 6/11-30/77,” Box 6, Jimmy Carter Library 
(hereafter cited as JCL); Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to President, “Joint Chiefs of Staff Recommendation on 
Strategic Bomber Modernization,” n.d., NSA 7 – Subject File, “B-1: 6/11-30/77,” Box 6, JCL; George C. Wilson, 
“Pentagon and Moscow Provide Arguments for Building B-1,” The Washington Post, June 8, 1977. 
28 Rep. Robert K. Dornan (R, CA) favored the B-1, saying it “keeps the Soviets off guard and keeps them from 
launching a first strike,” while Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D, NY) called the B-1 “the most expensive white elephant 
ever proposed by industry and the services.” Bernard Weinraub, “House Votes to Build B-1 Bomber As Carter 
Decision on Plane Nears,” New York Times, June 28, 1977.  
29 “Excerpts From President Carter’s Press Conference,” The Washington Post, July 1, 1977.  
30 George C. Wilson, “Improved A-Missile Is B-1 Alternative,” The Washington Post, July 2, 1977. 
31 Don Oberdorfer, “President Weighs Veto of Weapons Procurement Bill: President Weighs Vetoing Weapons 
Procurement Bill,” The Washington Post, August 17, 1978; Edward Walsh and Mary Russell, “Weapons Bill 





nuclear weapons infrastructure, and updated the nuclear targeting policy in PD-59.  The Defense 
budget increased in FY1980 and FY1981, as the administration requested $129 billion and $150 
billion, respectively.32  The Carter administration seemed to increase nuclear weapons’ role in 
national security; the range of weapons selected and the new targeting policy suggested a 
significant departure from MAD and a striving toward nuclear superiority.  
 
The Illogic of MAD? Carter and the Push for Nuclear Superiority 
As demonstrated above, Carter seemed to shift from policies calling for nuclear restraint 
to policies embracing nuclear superiority.  Some scholars have attempted to explain this shift, 
usually asserting that tensions with the Soviet Union required the U.S. to increase the role of 
nuclear weapons in its foreign policy.  One group of scholars argues the Carter administration 
“course corrected” in response to a perceived increase in the Soviet threat.  For example, Brian 
Auten draws on neorealist theory to argue Carter’s shift in nuclear policy was a prudent 
balancing reaction to increasing Soviet aggression in the international system.33  As the Soviet 
Union demonstrated its intent to fight a nuclear war, the U.S. adjusted its policy to deny Soviet 
victory.  Another group of scholars locates Carter within a broader trend of policymakers 
pushing for nuclear superiority during the Cold War.  This literature casts doubts on assumptions 
that U.S. policymakers always bought into the stability of deterrence by examining the evolution 
of nuclear strategy. 
                                                
32 Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1979), 1; Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings before a 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 1.  
33 Auten, Carter’s Conversion. For a similar argument, see Richard C. Thornton, The Carter Years: Toward a New 
Global Order (New York: Paragon House, 1992).  As Auten points out, however, for Thornton’s argument about a 






Since the invention of nuclear weapons, strategists have debated the best way to deter a 
nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies.  While the U.S. can adopt a range of strategies, they can 
be grouped into two general categories. The first, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), rests on 
the assumption that nuclear weapons are a revolutionary weapon used strictly for deterrence: 
nuclear weapons allow both sides to inflict devastating blows, so neither side will strike the 
other.  Nuclear weapons will prevent conventional war as both sides fear escalation to mutual 
annihilation.  If it pursued a strategy of MAD, the U.S. would not need so many nuclear 
weapons; a few large weapons capable of retaliating against Soviet cities would sufficiently deter 
the Soviets because of their potential for unbearable devastation.34   
The second type of strategy, damage limitation, assumes the U.S. must be able to destroy 
Soviet nuclear forces in order to have a credible deterrent.  In a state of MAD, Soviets might 
engage in lower levels of aggression toward U.S. allies, believing the U.S. would not respond 
with an all-out nuclear attack and risk a Soviet response targeting the U.S. homeland.  Damage 
limitation advocates argued the U.S. should build up its arsenal to engage in counterforce 
targeting, or targeting of Soviet military assets, to limit damage to the U.S. and its allies at any 
level of aggression.  Recent scholars argue policymakers from the 1960s onward—including 
Carter—publicly accepted MAD in their declaratory policy, but tried to escape it because they 
attached some political value to possessing nuclear superiority and reaping the national security 
benefits of nuclear weapons through a damage limitation strategy.35  According to these scholars, 
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concerns about U.S. leverage and its ability to credibly protect its allies motivated the belief that 
the U.S. required nuclear superiority and the ensuing push away from MAD.   
First, the push toward superiority reflected concerns about the state of U.S. extended 
deterrence if the U.S. adopted a MAD strategy.  If the U.S. reduced its arsenal down to a few 
nuclear weapons, allies might doubt the credibility of U.S. promises to deter a Soviet nuclear 
attack against them.  Would the U.S. really face homeland destruction and use some of its few 
nuclear weapons to retaliate against Soviet aggression in Western Europe?  The U.S. needed a 
sufficiently large nuclear arsenal to deploy theater nuclear weapons in Europe and develop 
capabilities to strike Soviet military targets, therefore controlling the escalation of a nuclear 
exchange.  Second, the U.S. pushed toward nuclear superiority because it attached some political 
leverage to it.  U.S. nuclear superiority helped explain its victory in previous crises, as the Soviet 
Union backed down because it knew the U.S. could bring overwhelming strategic force to bear 
in a confrontation.  Perceptions that the Soviet Union planned to fight and win a nuclear war only 
accelerated the push for nuclear superiority, as policymakers believed superiority would allow 
the U.S. to deny any level of Soviet attack and prevent Soviet victory.   
According to these scholars, this desire for superiority explains the U.S.’s embrace of 
damage limitation strategies during the late Cold War, which reinforced the need to build an 
arsenal to counter attacks at any escalation level.  It also explains the force buildups and 
modernization during this period; the U.S. improved the lethality and accuracy of its nuclear 
weapons, added missile defense systems, built stealth bombers, and developed MIRV 
capabilities, among other programs.  All of these capabilities suggest a discontent with MAD and 
a desire to surpass Soviet technology.  Finally, this push for superiority explains the U.S. interest 
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in arms control, as policymakers used arms control as an opportunity to make qualitative 
improvements to the remaining nuclear arsenal.  This would codify U.S. advantages in order to 
pursue damage limitation strategies; arms control functioned as a tool to enshrine nuclear 
superiority. 
It is true that many policymakers during the Cold War seemed to espouse strategies 
requiring nuclear superiority, as MAD was mainly championed by academics.  These scholars, 
however, fail to explain the causes of this push for superiority, and this supposed inevitable shift 
away from MAD may not have been as clear or inevitable as they claim.  At times, their 
evidence obfuscates the causality of their argument.  Austin Long and Brendan Green argue that 
the need for superiority led to the development of hard-target-kill (HTK) capabilities, while also 
arguing the advent of HTK made counterforce possible and “clearly motivated many of the 
doctrinal and programmatic decisions that elevated the strategic arms race to new heights.”36  
They suggest the desire for damage limitation strategies led to this technological change, but 
they also suggest technological change prompted the embrace of damage limitation.  If 
technological change led to this shift in strategy, it suggests that the desire for superiority did not 
drive the shift toward counterforce targeting and damage limitation. 
Additionally, policymakers lacked consensus about the need for superiority; they debated 
both the utility and possibility of gaining nuclear superiority during this period.  The authors 
assume all policymakers found some value in possessing nuclear superiority and did not believe 
the Soviet Union bought into MAD logic, but it is unclear that such a consensus existed.  Even 
during the Kennedy administration, where the U.S. may have had nuclear superiority in some 
areas, decisionmakers doubted nuclear superiority mattered in crises.  During the Cuban Missile 
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Crisis, Kennedy remarked, “What difference does it make? They’ve got enough to blow us up 
anyway.”  Trachtenberg further argues, “There is no evidence at all in the documents that anyone 
believed that the U.S. could face a war with confidence because of its vast nuclear power.”37  
When faced with the prospect of a nuclear showdown, Kennedy and his advisors did not believe 
having a superior nuclear arsenal would exert much influence on the Soviets’ behavior, as they 
still possessed the capability to inflict massive damage on the U.S. despite their inferiority. 
Decisionmakers also lacked consensus about the possibility of even achieving nuclear 
superiority.  As Schilling notes, every President since Eisenhower could have pushed the U.S. to 
achieve decisive nuclear superiority but all backed off, worried about exorbitantly high defense 
budgets and the potential detriment to domestic programs and Americans’ standard of living.38  
Lieber and Press even concede this point, saying strategies based on disarming the enemy, and 
thus requiring nuclear superiority, “Appeared impossible because the superpower arsenals were 
large and dispersed, and were considered easy to hide and protect.”39  They still suggest, 
however, that policymakers ignored this point as they kept obliviously pushing for superiority.  
Some policymakers may have indeed favored pursuing nuclear superiority in response to the 
perceived military threat, but each President recognized this course of action was unfeasible 
because of its cost and potential to encourage dangerous arms racing.  Not all policymakers 
believed in the necessity of pushing for nuclear superiority, so the U.S.’s embrace of damage 
limitation may not have stemmed from a collective recognition of the illogic of MAD.  
 Further, these scholars espouse a cynical view of arms control as a means to enshrine 
strategic superiority, but this downplays policymakers’ significant time and energy spent 
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pursuing major arms control agreements.  These measures occurred concomitantly with the shift 
toward damage limitation—policymakers may have only used them to enshrine U.S. superiority, 
but arms control still placed major restrictions on the arsenal and hindered the U.S.’s ability to 
maintain the nuclear superiority required for extensive damage limitation.  This assessment also 
downplays some policymakers’ serious dedication to arms control; Jimmy Carter believed 
deeply in the value of arms control, in one speech calling for both the reduction of arms and a 
freeze on modernization in order to produce “reciprocal stability, parity, and security.”40  This 
genuine commitment to arms control does not seem to be a strategic ploy to codify U.S. 
advantages, so the overwhelming push for nuclear superiority cannot explain the major 
investments in arms control during this period.  
 Finally, these scholars draws conclusions about policymakers’ distaste for MAD by using 
evidence from some aspects of nuclear strategy, but they ignore declaratory policy.  There are 
many levels of nuclear policy: declaratory, employment, operational, acquisition, and 
deployment.  These scholars might contend that declaratory policy—the aggregation of public 
statements about nucelar posture—is irrelevant because it does not reveal policymakers’ true 
intent; leaders might continue to advocate MAD on the declaratory level while pursuing 
superiority at every other level.  Indeed, public rhetoric from Presidents like Nixon and Carter 
often denied the importance of nuclear superiority in maintaining deterrence.  This public 
rhetoric, however, has inherent significance, as policymakers deployed this language to send 
signals about the nature of U.S. nuclear posture to domestic and international audiences.  
Policymakers could have adjusted their rhetoric to explain the necessity of nuclear superiority, 
but they maintained language adhering to MAD; they must have ascribed some political value to 
                                                






this rhetoric.  By de-emphasizing declaratory policy in their analysis of nuclear policy’s 
evolution, these scholars divorce the outcome—damage limitation strategies—from the politics 
of formulating this strategy and shaping audience perceptions of it.  Analysis assuming a 
collective push away from MAD ignores the contestation at every level of policy and cannot 
explain how this view of the importance of nuclear superiority came to dominate strategic 
planning.    
 
Hawks and Doves: Domestic Politics and Nuclear Policy  
Some scholars have offered an alternative account of Carter’s policy shift; they highlight 
the domestic politics influencing Carter’s strategy to show the lack of consensus within the U.S. 
about the correct trajectory of foreign policy.  These accounts, however, fail to explain why and 
how domestic coalitions mobilized against Carter, and why Carter’s opposition seemed to 
sabotage his agenda.  Some argue public disapproval of Carter inhibited him from carrying out 
his desired policies, forcing him to eventually capitulate and adopt a more hawkish policy to 
reflect public demand.  Interest groups helped intensify this public opposition, which further 
increased the public backlash against Carter.  Dan Caldwell argues Carter tried to sell the SALT 
II treaty to the public, but the treaty failed in the Senate because hawkish defense interest groups 
and public opinion hijacked Carter’s desire for arms control.41  Others point to Congressional 
opinion as the key factor undermining Carter’s policy.  A hawkish coalition in the Senate 
blocked Carter’s initial policy goals, but in order for Carter to gain approval for any nuclear 
policy, he needed to appease this group.  For instance, Fred Kaplan and Martin Sherwin 
                                                






speculate that Carter approved PD-59 and other modernization programs because he had fallen 
out of favor with the Senate; he needed these programs to appease Senate hawks.42 
While these accounts illustrate how Carter needed to balance demands from various 
domestic groups as he formulated his nuclear policy, they do not completely explain why Carter 
selected specific policies, nor why he could not prevent the mobilization of this opposition 
against him.  Public opinion, for example, may not have had a direct causal effect on Carter’s 
selection of nuclear policy, as a large segment of the domestic public remained uninformed and 
apathetic about it.  The hostile public opinion likely created domestic pressure for Carter to 
address constituents’ concerns, but Carter still could have combatted public accusations of 
weakness by demonstrating that his nuclear policy would, in fact, provide the U.S. with a strong 
defense.  It is also not clear why interest groups were so successful at mobilizing this public 
opinion on issues like SALT if “most Americans did not perceive the issue of arms control as 
affecting their interests.”43  Without understanding why these groups mobilized against Carter, 
we cannot understand the underlying causes of Carter’s shifting policy as he responded to this 
mobilization. 
Similarly, the Congressional opposition explanation does not explain why this hawkish 
coalition mobilized so successfully against Carter’s agenda.  Both the House and the Senate had 
Democratic majorities through Carter’s entire term, so he should have had more agency to push 
his nuclear policies through Congress.  This suggests Carter faced a bipartisan coalition of 
opponents, but these scholars do not explain why this hawkish coalition gained strength and why 
Carter could not silence this opposition.  Understanding these processes will shed light on why 
Carter may have shifted his nuclear policy in response to this domestic contestation.  In the next 
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section, I advance a theory explaining how actors use legitimation to build coalitions and 
undermine opponents; this will clarify how the process of nuclear strategy debate allowed a 
coalition to mobilize against Carter and force him to shift his strategy. 
 
Narrative, Coalition-Building, and Legitimation 
 
Nuclear policy, like other areas of domestic and foreign policy, is often the site of 
profound contestation, as different coalitions compete to justify their desired policy.  I argue that 
unsettled moments, in which various groups advance narratives about the trajectory of future 
policy, offer the greatest opportunity for groups to mobilize public support for their vision.  I 
draw from theories of agenda setting to understand this competition, as actors try to place their 
policies on leaders’ agendas and define the dominant foreign policy narrative.  First, I describe 
the concept of legitimation, the central mechanism by which actors gain or undermine support 
through their justification of policy to an audience.  To gain support for their position, actors 
must use legitimation strategies that have resonance, meaning the rhetoric conforms to norms the 
audience deems acceptable.  This legitimation can also undermine support for the opposition by 
demonstrating the illegitimacy of opponents’ claims, denying them the ability to mobilize.  One 
group eventually silences their opponents through this process of argumentation, building a 
coalition around their desired narrative until it dominates public debate. 
Legitimation is central to the process of attracting support to one coalition and 
undermining another, as it allows coalitions to explain why audiences should prefer their policy 
options over others.  I define legitimation as the process of justifying actions through rhetoric 
invoking existing norms and rules to appeal to an audience.44  Even though some realists dismiss 
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rhetoric as “cheap talk,” they have historically recognized the importance of framing issues to 
gain public approval.  For instance, Morgenthau knew the rise of mass politics required grand 
strategists to use rhetoric to articulate the national interest as a means to generate consensus.45  
Foreign policy is often characterized by a debate between multiple factions articulating different 
visions of the U.S.’s role in the world, and these factions must explain why the public and 
domestic elites should support and adopt their viewpoint over others.  Rhetoric and legitimation 
become central to both building a coalition and competing with others because the weaker side 
uses their arguments to reframe situations and make others sympathetic to their cause––in other 
words, “Structuring the world so you can win.”46  
In fact, some scholars have recognized legitimation’s importance in foreign policy, even 
focusing on Carter’s failure to legitimate his original vision of foreign policy.  David Skidmore 
describes Carter's intended defense policy as a coordinated response to the U.S.’s hegemonic 
decline after the Vietnam War, arguing Carter shifted because he failed to legitimate his 
envisioned strategy.47  Skidmore draws on Alexander George’s theory of legitimation, claiming 
legitimation must resonate with the public’s fixed interests.48  The public was predisposed to 
favor more interventionist and confrontational policies, so Carter would have needed to either 
justify his policy to appeal to these fixed interests or bring about an entirely new consensus.  
While I accept legitimation’s ability to shape policy outcomes, I argue that effective legitimation 
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does not require this consensus; successful legitimation can change people’s opinions, and even 
then people can still recognize the legitimacy of their non-preferred options.  Further, this 
account suggests Carter’s legitimation was doomed from the beginning, failing to explain why 
Carter would have strategically selected such a strategy.  By conceptualizing legitimation as a 
means to mobilize support, my theory will better explain the conditions under which effective 
legitimation affects policy outcomes. 
Foreign policy legitimation during the Carter administration took place during a moment 
of deep uncertainty about the future of nuclear policy, as the U.S. and Soviet Union had reached 
strategic parity.  As I will argue in Chapter 2, parity represented an “unsettled moment”: a 
moment where multiple narratives about the current state of affairs coexist in public debate.49  
Policymakers could not agree on the foreign policy implications of parity, and the public 
accepted multiple interpretations of this moment.  In this unsettled moment, Carter should have 
been able to weave a narrative about the stability of parity from his position of authority, using 
this interpretation to guide the U.S. toward a decreased role for nuclear weapons in national 
security policy.  Why, then, did Carter fail to legitimate his strategy and bring clarity to the 
confusion about parity?  Ronald Krebs, whose work examines why and how national security 
narratives come to dominate public debate, would argue Carter adopted the wrong type of 
rhetoric at this moment.  He predicts that storytelling, rather than argumentation, allows 
Presidents to seize the opportunity in unsettled moments and bring their desired narrative to the 
fore.50  On its face, however, Carter’s rhetoric seems to fit this storytelling mode, as he 
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recognized the existence of differing views and strived to make sense of parity to generate a 
shared understanding of it.  Thus, Krebs’s theory incorrectly predicts the outcome in Carter’s 
case.  
Moreover, Krebs’s theory does not consider how unsettled moments open up space for 
multiple legitimations and give other groups more power to mobilize against the President.  
Krebs assumes the structural context of public debate constrains Presidential oratory, but 
otherwise, the President has the authority to determine the national narrative.  Presidents 
certainly have a platform granting them the ability to construct arguments and stories.  At the 
same time, however, these messages must reach a receptive audience—the audience might 
respond to or challenge the narrative rather than always act as its passive receiver.  Presidential 
rhetoric and the structural context alone cannot account for the creation or erosion of national 
security narratives, as unsettled moments give more power and agency to actors legitimating 
alternative narratives.  This provides an audience of domestic coalitions the opportunity to unseat 
other narratives.  Below, I characterize this process of narrative contestation and describe how 
legitimation serves as a key mechanism in this competition. 
Some might question legitimation’s relevance to nuclear policy, as debates about these 
issues take place largely in private.  The public cannot be mobilized because they are uneducated 
about and indifferent towards foreign policy.  I argue, however, that private planning often still 
becomes visible to the public in the form of speeches, Congressional hearings, leaks to the press, 
and more.  This public visibility requires leaders to justify why their policy makes sense for 
achieving a political or military outcome.  Additionally, the mechanisms of legitimation still 
function in the private sphere even if the audience of legitimation shrinks to only a few people.  
                                                                                                                                                       






In public and private settings, speakers care about using language their audience deems 
acceptable; they are constrained by “the civilizing force of hypocrisy”—they face backlash if 
they appear to support a policy out of narrow, parochial interests.51  Greenhill defines these 
hypocrisy costs as “Symbolic political costs that can be imposed where there exists a real (or 
perceived) disparity between a professed commitment to…international norms and demonstrated 
state actions that contravene such a commitment.”52  If legitimation only seems to appeal to the 
speaker’s self-interest, the audience doubts her commitment to serving the broader public. This 
hypocrisy causes others to question the speaker’s reputation and divert their support away from 
the speaker.53  Even in private, leaders know they will eventually justify their policy to the 
public, so their private legitimation should bear similarity to that of the public sphere.   
In both public and private, groups use legitimation to justify their views and mobilize a 
coalition of support.   They inevitably compete with coalitions holding alternate views; to 
understand this process of contestation, I draw on theories of agenda setting from American 
Politics literature.  Agenda setting conceptualizes the contestation over policy options as a 
political process in and of itself.  According to Schattschneider, “The definition of the 
alternatives is the supreme instrument of power”;54 certain policy problems and solutions become 
the focus of leaders’ attention through a process of debate and contestation. The groups who 
successfully explain their policy problems and attract public attention gain power because they 
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get to define the solutions to the problems, having isolated and silenced their opposition.  While 
the theory focuses on domestic policy issues, it is also relevant to foreign policy.55  The group 
who defines the policy agenda gets to determine the solutions, since articulating a particular 
vision of foreign policy dictates a specific range of concrete policy options.  In this case, the 
winners of this competition can elevate their foreign policy narrative to become the dominant 
public narrative.  Victory in this form of competition requires effective legitimation, which must 
achieve two tasks: gain support for their coalition’s position and undermine support for the 
opposing coalition.  
First, groups must gain support by justifying their position so that others recognize it as 
valuable or desirable.  Audiences will only join a coalition if they find its policy justification 
acceptable, sensible, and relevant.  In other words, successful legitimation must resonate, or have 
“pertinence, relevance, or significance” for the audience.56  The most effective rhetoric has 
content appealing to some accepted principles, such as norms, interests, identities, or legal 
structures.  It could also demonstrate expertise or authority on an issue, or make policies appear 
practical or feasible.  Moreover, this legitimation must be “multivocal,” or resonate with multiple 
audiences—actors want to win skeptics to their coalition without alienating existing supporters.57  
Thus, they need to strategically select rhetoric that will appeal to multiple rules and norms in 
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order to draw the most support toward their coalition.  To aid this legitimation, actors can try to 
increase their position’s public visibility, attracting a potential audience to potentially mobilize. 
Scholars of agenda setting describe this as a process of “coalitional outbidding”: by bringing 
debates into the public sphere and “expanding the scope of conflict,” a weaker group can not 
only bring awareness to their policy alternatives but also mobilize support and attract allies to 
strengthen its position.58  If groups gain this public visibility and use resonant legitimation, they 
can gain support, gain Congressional attention, and gain the ability to influence the President’s 
agenda.  
As actors use legitimation to gain support for their position, they must also use this 
legitimation to delegitimize and undermine support for their opponent’s policy.  As they expand 
the scope of conflict, groups also gain the opportunity to wrench support away from the 
opposition.  Actors use rhetorical coercion to demonstrate the illegitimacy of opponents’ claims 
and prevent a rival group from mobilizing a coalition with its own rhetoric.  By using resonant 
rhetoric, actors can demonstrate that opposition rhetoric is contradictory or unacceptable within a 
particular normative framework, inflicting hypocrisy costs and depriving the opponent of the 
tools to create a publicly acceptable response.59  Actors trap opponents with their own words, 
preventing them from successfully legitimating their policy and therefore preventing the 
opponent from mobilizing support.  Eventually, this argumentation will completely silence the 
opposition, granting the remaining coalition the ability to carry out their policy agenda driven by 
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their desired narrative.  Rhetoric, then, becomes essential for building and destroying domestic 
coalitions and subsequently constructing a policy agenda—actors use legitimation as a strategic 
bid for power.    
In sum, I argue policy outcomes can be explained by a process of contestation among 
domestic coalitions legitimating their desired strategies.  In both the public and private spheres, 
actors mobilize support by using rhetoric that resonates with a wide audience by appealing to a 
variety of norms.  They also use this legitimation to accuse their opponents of trespassing on 
these same norms, demonstrating the illegitimacy of the opposing view. This rhetoric silences 
and weakens other coalitions, as it denies them the ability to use resonant language to mobilize 
their own base of support.  Unsettled moments provide the motivation and opportunity for 
groups to begin this process of contestation, as they provide the space for multiple groups to 
compete to define the dominant narrative and seize control of the policy agenda. 
 
Methodology  
I test this theory of the role of legitimation and coalition-building in influencing policy 
outcomes alongside competing explanations of the dependent variable, Carter’s nuclear policy 
choices.  I will test the following hypotheses:  
1. Carter’s embrace of damage limitation policies resulted from opposing coalitions’ 
increasing ability to successfully mobilize and legitimate their desired strategy 
2. Carter’s policies resulted from his recognition of an increasing Soviet threat and his 
concern for U.S. ability to deter attacks on its allies and the homeland 
3. Carter’s policies resulted from his response to increasing political weakness due to 





Under the first hypothesis, domestic actors should attempt to justify nuclear strategies to public 
audiences and to each other, appealing to norms like deterrence to legitimate their strategies.  
This public audience will include the mass public, Congressmen, and other prominent public 
figures in nuclear policy, such as leaders of defense interest groups.  The process of debate and 
legitimation will also occur in private, but it should intensify as the debate gains public visibility.  
Actors may try to make their arguments visible to gain support for their coalition and publicly 
delegitimize their opposition.  We should expect to see evidence of this process of legitimation: 
actors will try to impose hypocrisy costs on their opponents by pointing out contradictions or 
instances where their arguments violate existing norms and seem to undermine U.S. security.  
Conversely, groups should demonstrate their understand the dangers of violating these norms in 
their own legitimation and shift their rhetoric to avoid hypocrisy costs.  Finally, each winning 
policy outcome will have the support of a significant coalition of government and non-
government actors, and MAD-type policies will lose support as they come to be seen as less 
legitimate.  
 Under the second hypothesis, the Carter administration would embrace policies based on 
an optimistic view of parity during periods where they perceive the Soviets to be cooperating 
with the U.S.  As they perceived an increase in the Soviet threat, they would reach a consensus 
that damage limitation would best counter these provocations.  This policy shift would occur in 
response to either specific acts of Soviet aggression that the U.S. deems an attempted increase in 
Soviet geopolitical influence (such as conventional provocations in Third World countries), or to 
increases in Soviet capabilities which demonstrate they intend to fight and win a nuclear war.  
The administration would express dissatisfaction with MAD in light of concerns about U.S. 





threat in his policy justification, particularly when discussing the importance of extended 
deterrence, demonstrating his understanding that nuclear superiority would best allow the U.S. to 
counter a Soviet warfighting posture.   
 Under the third hypothesis, Carter would succeed in executing policies based on his 
optimistic view of parity when he has high levels of support in Congress and polls favorably 
among the American public on foreign or defense policy.  We would see presidential weakness 
as Carter’s poll numbers fall and he struggles to execute his legislative agenda.  As 
Congressional opposition mounts and the public becomes increasingly alarmed about the Soviet 
threat, Carter moves toward damage limitation in an attempt to appease these groups and address 
their specific demands.   
 To test these hypotheses, I conduct process-tracing to follow the development of Carter’s 
policy, taking care to reconstruct these historical events with as much accuracy as possible.  To 
track debates about various policies and assess the roles of different coalitions, I use articles from 
the New York Times and the Washington Post.  While newspaper coverage does not convey the 
degree of public attention given to policy debates, newspapers provide context for the debates 
and allow me to use qualitative software to analyze patterns and changes in different actors’ 
legitimation strategies.  I consult Carter’s speeches in The American Presidency Project to track 
his rhetoric and policy justification, and utilize other public documents like Congressional 
hearings to assess how other actors advocate for their desired policy. There are many levels of 
military strategy, including declaratory policy, acquisition policy, and deployment policy, and 
these documents may only reveal declaratory postures and obscure other levels of policy.  The 
declaratory policy has inherent value, however, as it reveals the shifting narratives about parity 





private documents from the National Security Archive and the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library 
to trace the private decisionmaking process and test whether the same dynamics of legitimation 
function in the private sphere. Many of these documents still remain classified, so I cannot 
capture all the details of the decisionmaking process.  To mitigate this limitation, I corroborate 
across sources to obtain a general picture of different key actors’ positions on the various issues 
and how the trajectory of debate changes over time.   
This thesis proceeds as follows to test my theory of coalition-building and legitimation in 
Carter's nuclear policy.  The next chapter establishes parity as an unsettled moment and discusses 
Paul Warnke’s nomination as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
demonstrate early mobilization of Carter’s opposing coalition.  Chapter 3 analyzes the failure of 
SALT II and Carter’s approval of the MX, demonstrating how Carter’s public rhetoric about 
arms control backfired and allowed a coalition to mobilize and hijack the debate about the treaty.  
Chapter 4 examines the private debate about nuclear strategy leading to PD-59, demonstrating 
how the lack of legitimation required in the private sphere prevented dissenters from mobilizing 
against this strategy.  Finally, I conclude with a brief summary of my findings and a discussion 









Parity and the Carter Administration 
 
Senator Danforth: It seems to me that we are really voting for a 
philosophy even more than for an individual in this case.60 
 
Carter began his Presidency with ambitious goals to reduce the role of nuclear weapons 
in foreign policy, but by its end, he had bolstered their importance and taken steps to gain 
strategic advantages over the Soviet Union.  Throughout his term, domestic debates swirled 
about the meaning of strategic parity, allowing a coalition fearful of this parity to gain visibility 
as they opposed Carter’s agenda.  This chapter establishes this context of parity as an unsettled 
moment, as parity forced actors to formulate interpretations of its meaning for the future of 
nuclear policy.  One coalition offered a narrative of parity as an opportunity to reduce the arsenal 
and embrace a MAD posture.  Meanwhile, another coalition offered a narrative of parity as a 
potential threat to national security because they feared the U.S. would lose political leverage; 
the U.S. needed a damage limitation strategy to prevent Soviet superiority.  Their rhetoric needed 
to conform to the norm of deterrence as they legitimated their narratives, avoiding accusations of 
favoring unilateral disarmament or warfighting strategies.  Next, this chapter describes the 
controversy over Carter’s nominee for Director of the ACDA to show an early example of this 
debate about parity.  In this case, opponents used rhetoric around the fear of unilateral 
disarmament to delegitimize Carter and Warnke’s position of restraint, arguing it allowed Soviet 
superiority and undermined deterrence.  A hawkish coalition broadened this debate to mobilize 
support for their narrative requiring the U.S. to deny Soviet advantages; Carter lost a chance to 
silence them and gain support for his narrative of parity.  
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Parity: An Unsettled Moment  
 In order to test the theory described in Chapter 1, I will first demonstrate that the context 
in which Carter made policy decisions was, in fact, an unsettled moment.  Parity, according to 
intelligence and military assessments, meant the U.S. and the Soviet Union possessed roughly 
equivalent nuclear arsenals in terms of both numbers and capabilities.  By the time Carter arrived 
in office, debates about the meaning of this parity swirled about the public discourse on nuclear 
weapons.61  I argue this numerical parity generated deep uncertainty about its implications for 
U.S. national security and the future of deterrence.  I will show how this moment created space 
for coalitions to tell different narratives about parity, rendering it an unsettled moment.  Within 
these narratives, actors had the freedom to legitimate various policy agendas with roughly equal 
public acceptance, although their rhetoric needed to adhere to existing norms of deterrence.  The 
coalitions could use these bounds of legitimation to undermine opponents as they tried to 
transform their interpretation of parity into the dominant, settled narrative. 
 Most in the U.S. could agree the two superpowers had arrived at a moment of numerical 
parity, but the meaning of this parity remained unclear.  Numbers of nuclear weapons did not 
objectively translate to particular political effects or war outcomes, so numerical parity did not 
immediately dictate specific political consequences for the U.S.-Soviet relationship.  
Government officials regarded parity as an event of “major political and military significance,” 
but they could not specify the nature of this significance.62  The CIA declared in one NIE, 
“Parity in this sense cannot be objectively measured; it is essentially a state of mind.”63 While 
the CIA was confident about the existence of the nuclear arsenals’ overall equivalence, they 
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could not determine how parity would affect the actual conduct of a nuclear war, rendering the 
political and military effects of parity indeterminate.  Documents associated with Presidential 
Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, one of Carter’s nuclear policy studies, also expressed 
ambivalence about parity’s implications for U.S. ability to use its nuclear forces for leverage 
over the Soviet Union: “The continuance of an American option to manipulate strategic forces 
for political purposes is, at best, uncertain.”64  Parity was less an objective fact and more a state 
of mind, because it lacked an inherent meaning and compelled actors to create their own 
narrative about parity’s effect on future foreign policy. 
 Parity served as an unsettled moment because actors constructed two opposing narratives 
about its meaning, both of which were seen as legitimate by those involved in nuclear policy 
debates.  If parity represented a settled moment, virtually all policymakers would have agreed on 
a particular interpretation of parity, and policies at odds with this narrative would seem 
illegitimate.  Settled moments still permit policy disagreements, such as how much to increase or 
decrease nuclear forces, but the debates stay within one broad framework for understanding 
foreign policy.  This moment of parity, however, better fits the definition of an unsettled 
moment, as it created a major rift between domestic coalitions as they struggled to interpret 
parity.  In an unsettled moment, there is “no single storyline that serves the regnant common 
sense.”65 Multiple narratives about the meaning of such a moment feature prominently in public 
debate with roughly equal legitimacy.   
 The age of superiority still featured differing views about nuclear strategy, but they 
embraced a common narrative of the security of the U.S. deterrent.  Parity, however, upended 
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this consensus as it forced the creation of narratives with vastly different implications for U.S. 
deterrence.  During superiority, actors avoided major debates about the political utility of nuclear 
weapons.  MAD advocates could argue the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal did not matter to 
maintaining deterrence, as deterrence only relied on at least one weapon’s devastating retaliatory 
capability.  Damage limitation advocates could argue nuclear superiority allowed the U.S. to 
deter the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union would not escalate a crisis if the U.S. had 
overwhelming nuclear capability to match any level of nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies.  In 
the age of superiority, both groups had faith in the U.S.’s ability to deter, and they could debate 
nuclear strategy while avoiding major disagreements about the political meaning of nuclear 
weapons.  Parity led these groups to vastly different conclusions about this meaning and placed 
their narratives in direct conflict with each other.  
 One narrative saw parity as a promising development while the other saw it as a potential 
threat, and each had implications for a specific trajectory of U.S. foreign policy.  The MAD 
group viewed parity as a moment of opportunity and stability, as the U.S. and Soviet Union 
would recognize the rough equality in the destructive power of their nuclear arsenals.  If the 
arsenals effectively canceled each other out, both sides could draw down the arms race and make 
cuts to their nuclear stockpiles.66  Parity became an opportunity to finally embrace MAD and 
make progress on arms control, reinforcing the equality found in the balance of terror and 
vindicating nuclear weapons’ primary role for deterrence.  The damage limitation group, on the 
other hand, believed parity left the U.S. in a tenuous position as the Soviet Union actively sought 
superiority.  They worried about parity’s implications for U.S. extended deterrence; if the U.S. 
and Soviets were locked into nuclear equivalence, the Soviets might doubt U.S. commitment to 
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escalation in response to Soviet conventional provocation.  Bolstering U.S. counterforce 
capability could address these concerns by allowing the U.S. to thwart any level of Soviet attack 
via strikes against military assets.67  This group viewed parity as a threat because they still 
attached political leverage to having nuclear superiority; nuclear weapons provided additional 
utility beyond deterrence, so the loss of this leverage in the age of parity would erode U.S. 
security.  Overall, parity’s ambiguity created the impetus for one group to demonstrate parity’s 
potential threat while the other attempted to demonstrate parity’s potential opportunity to 
enhance security.   
These coalitions used rhetoric to justify their policy agendas within a particular parity 
narrative, but they still observed boundaries on the content of their legitimation.  In particular, 
their rhetoric respected the norm of deterrence.  Policymakers had constructed a set of ideas 
about how the U.S. ought to deter, and legitimate speech about nuclear policy had to conform to 
these ideas.  Deterrence has been the centerpiece of strategy in the nuclear age: how can the U.S. 
prevent the massive devastation of a nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies?  From the beginning 
of the Cold War to the arrival of parity, policymakers, intellectuals, and military strategists 
developed and settled on interpretations of deterrence, combining them to create a collective 
understanding of deterrence to ascribe meaning to the reality of the nuclear age.  Although 
deterrence existed objectively as long as no nuclear war occurred, the U.S. built entire strategies, 
weapons systems, and schools of thought around its beliefs about deterrence.  Deterrence 
functioned as a norm in this regard, as it permitted a range of acceptable ideas about nuclear 
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weapons.   Actors could craft and justify strategies that appealed to this norm and faced public 
criticism for strategies appearing to undermine deterrence.  
The norm of deterrence created several bounds in rhetoric about nuclear strategy.  First, 
those ascribing to the damage limitation school could justify strategies denying Soviet victory, 
but they could not call for a strategy explicitly seeking nuclear superiority.  Opponents could 
accuse such a policy of violating norms of deterrence because it seemed to suggest the U.S. 
contemplated first use of nuclear weapons in a crisis.  Why pursue costly force buildups to regain 
nuclear superiority if deterrence only required the U.S. to use its weapons in retaliation against a 
Soviet attack?  Relatedly, actors could not justify strategies implying the U.S. had a concept of 
fighting and winning a nuclear war.  Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara faced public 
backlash from his 1962 “No Cities” speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he articulated a new 
strategy treating nuclear weapons like conventional weapons, saying, “The principal military 
objectives...should be the destruction of the enemy’s forces, not his civilian population.”68  He 
recanted on this position as domestic audiences worried about the costs of this strategy and 
feared this declaratory policy implied the U.S. would strike first and thus initiate nuclear war.69  
Moreover, treating nuclear weapons like conventional weapons implied the U.S. could win a 
nuclear war as it had won conventional wars; it suggested the U.S. would be willing to wage 
nuclear war at the expense of its citizens.  Even pessimists about parity insisted their strategies 
were not “war-winning,” recognizing that this type of speech rejected the idea of the nuclear 
revolution and violated the norm of deterrence.70  
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Second, optimists about parity could call for a MAD strategy reducing the size of the 
U.S. arsenal, but they could not justify these policies by citing nuclear weapons’ complete lack 
of political utility.  This notion differed from the claim that numbers of nuclear weapons did not 
matter—numbers were irrelevant because the U.S. only needed a few weapons to retaliate and 
maintain deterrence.  If actors completely divorced nuclear weapons from political goals, 
however, they rejected the conviction that nuclear weapons were essential for deterrence.  By 
renouncing the logic of MAD, such claims faced allegations that the policies would undermine 
deterrence.  Similarly, actors also could not suggest the U.S. begin to disarm without seeking 
balanced reductions from the Soviet Union.  As I will describe below, the suggestion that 
Carter’s nominee for Director of the ACDA favored unilateral disarmament sparked heated 
domestic debates.  Unilateral disarmament led to U.S. inferiority, a concept difficult for a 
country locked into a superpower arms race to accept.  If the U.S. gave up the position of 
dominance it had enjoyed since the end of World War II, it would lose some leverage in the eyes 
of the Soviet Union, Allies, or the domestic population.  Therefore, policy suggesting unbalanced 
reductions faced criticism it would leave the U.S. unable to deter a nuclear attack.  The existence 
of parity did not inherently threaten deterrence, but coalitions adhering to both narratives of 
parity had to legitimate policies that did not threaten long-standing norms of deterrence.    
 This competition between parity narratives took place throughout Carter’s term, as actors 
on both sides tried to legitimate their interpretation and justify a policy agenda without 
suggesting the U.S. accept inferiority or pursue war-fighting measures.   Within these bounds, 
actors tried to make arguments that resonated with their audience to win support for their 
narrative.  Elite support for both narratives afforded them some legitimacy.  For example, in the 





U.S. could accept parity and did not need to aggressively counter Soviet actions.  Meanwhile, 
people like Rumsfeld and Lt. Gen. George L. Keegan, Jr., former head of Air Force Intelligence, 
argued the Soviets did seek superiority so any U.S. restraint could be destabilizing.71  The 
coalitions also legitimated their narratives by describing different roles for nuclear weapons in 
national security.  Parity optimists believed parity affirmed nuclear weapons’ sole purpose of 
deterrence—parity’s stability implied the U.S. could reduce the arsenal and return to a strictly 
retaliatory strategy.  Pessimists argued nuclear weapons had addition utility in addition to 
deterrence; possession of nuclear weapons afforded states additional coercive power, so the U.S. 
needed to prevent inferiority and the loss of this power.  In both legitimations, actors respected 
MAD logic as they interpreted parity, placing their rhetoric within the norm of deterrence to 
avoid criticism from their opponents.  
Media coverage further illustrated the scope of this debate; for example, the New York 
Times published the side-by-side editorials “The Promise of Disarmament” and “The Perils of 
Détente.”  In the former, Richard Barnet of the progressive Institute for Policy Studies argued 
that superiority was unattainable and meaningless, so the superpowers should accept each other 
as equals and focus on arms cuts.  In the latter, Walter Laqueur of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies argued the Soviet Union sought superiority, and he feared allies would 
pivot to the Soviet Union if the U.S. lost the political leverage from its military superiority.72  
The paper also showcased side-by-side editorials from the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet 
Relations and Nitze’s hawkish Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), in which the first group 
warned, “The dangers of restraint are less than those of an all-out weapons race.”  The CPD 
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warned instead that if the U.S. did not match Soviet weapons buildups, it would “find [itself] 
isolated in a hostile world, facing the unremitting pressures of Soviet policy backed by an 
overwhelming preponderance of military power.”73 Domestic elites were divided on the meaning 
of parity, Soviet intentions, and the utility of nuclear superiority, with an increasingly vocal 
hawkish group warning of the consequences of incipient Soviet superiority.   
 Coming into office, Carter told the optimistic narrative about parity as he warned against 
arms racing to regain superiority and emphasized arms control.  In his Inaugural Address, he 
observed, “The world is still engaged in a massive armaments race designed to ensure continuing 
equivalent strength,” and proposed instead devoting more energy to disarmament.74  In May 
1977, he called for maintaining parity by making substantial arms cuts along with a freeze on 
nuclear modernization.75  By the end of his term, however, Carter’s rhetoric seemed to embrace 
both narratives of parity; the pessimistic view had gained a stronger foothold in the official 
narrative.  For example, in one August 1980 speech, Carter both described the irrelevance of 
superiority and justified his nuclear strategy as a means to deny any Soviet advantage.  On one 
hand, it was useless “to increase [nuclear] destructive power in search of a temporary edge or in 
pursuit of an illusion of absolute nuclear superiority”; on the other hand, his targeting policy, 
PD-59, required increased U.S. nuclear capability so that “no potential enemy of the U.S. should 
anticipate for one moment a successful use of military power against our vital interests.”76  In 
other 1980 speeches, Carter boasted about reversing the Republican decline in defense while still 
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urging a continued commitment to arms control.77  Thus, Carter entered office in this unsettled 
moment but failed to elevate his vision of restraint and stability to become the dominant 
narrative.  The rest of this thesis will evaluate the reasons for Carter's failure to mobilize support 
and gain widespread acceptance of his parity narrative.  The next section describes the 
controversy over Carter’s ACDA nomination to demonstrate the contestation between these 
narratives and the mechanisms by which the coalition against Carter gained legitimacy while 
undermining Carter’s narrative. 
 
Reciprocal Restraint or Unilateral Disarmament? The Nomination of Paul Warnke  
 In January 1977, Carter sparked an unusually heated domestic debate when he nominated 
Paul C. Warnke as Director of the ACDA and chief negotiator for SALT II.  The controversy 
over Warnke illustrates the unsettled nature of parity, as the actors involved in the debate based 
their opinions about Warnke on their conceptions of parity and deterrence.  This nomination was 
one of Carter’s first chances to make a clear statement about his arms control goals and define 
his desired narrative about parity as an opportunity for restraint.  Although Warnke received 
Senate confirmation for both positions, the incident fomented the mobilization of hawkish 
domestic elites arguing that restraint in nuclear policy permitted Soviet superiority and violated 
norms of deterrence.  
 Before receiving Carter’s nomination, Warnke had entered government during the 
Johnson administration and became the Undersecretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs under Robert McNamara.  Warnke also served as an adviser to Senator George 
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McGovern during his 1972 Presidential campaign.78  Though not a pacifist, Warnke had 
criticized the Vietnam War and became a strong advocate for arms control in the 1970s.  His 
most famous article, a 1975 Foreign Policy piece called “Apes on a Treadmill,” decried the 
endless arms race and called for “reciprocal restraint;” he suggested the U.S. pause development 
of the B-1 and the Trident submarine for six months to encourage the Soviet Union to similarly 
curb its modernization programs.79  Thus, Warnke seemed a good candidate to advance Carter’s 
goals, as he doubted the logic of a ceaseless push for nuclear superiority or the use of new 
weapons programs as bargaining chips in arms control.  At the same time, this nomination 
signaled Carter’s exclusion of hawks like Nitze from his administration.  Carter sent a signal that 
he would prioritize arms control and elevate people whose conception of parity meant an 
opportunity for restraint and stability.    
 Almost immediately, however, critics spoke out against Warnke with unusual vitriol, 
expressing particular alarm at Warnke’s views in the “Apes on a Treadmill” article.  Several 
hawkish defense-oriented interest groups, most notably the Emergency Coalition Against 
Unilateral Disarmament, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, and the CPD, circulated 
memos to Congressmen urging them to oppose the nomination.  They argued Warnke favored 
unilateral disarmament and highlighted previous statements suggesting the irrelevance of nuclear 
superiority to claim that Warnke would negotiate arms control granting Soviet superiority.80  
Many in Congress, especially Democrats, grew alarmed at Warnke’s statements; although his 
confirmation fell under the purview of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, both the Senate 
and House Armed Services Committees called Warnke to testify as they feared the defense 
                                                
78 “Paul C. Warnke, Arms Control Negotiator, Dies at 81,” Arms Control Association, last modified January 1, 2002, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01-02/warnkejanfeb02. 
79 Paul C. Warnke, “Apes on a Treadmill,” Foreign Policy no. 18 (1975): 27-29. 
80 “Democrats’ Group Admits Writing Warnke Critique,” The Washington Post, February 5, 1977; Sanders, 





implications of his nomination.  Senators also demanded to split the nomination and take a vote 
on Warnke for each position rather than both together.81   
 What prompted this fierce objection?  First, critics believed Warnke’s statements 
contradicted Carter’s pledges for a strong defense.  They argued that the promise of a defense 
capability “second to none” was incompatible with even hints of unilateral restraint, calling into 
question Carter’s actual commitment to safeguarding national security.82  Second, critics used 
accusations of unilateral disarmament as a rhetorical tool to push Warnke’s position outside the 
bounds of deterrence.  Unilateral disarmament represented a major security threat because many 
feared the Soviet Union would not reciprocate U.S. restraint.  In that case, the U.S. would permit 
Soviet buildups until the U.S. did not have sufficient forces left to retaliate after a Soviet first 
strike.  By accusing Warnke of advocating unilateral disarmament, critics hoped to delegitimize 
his position as they convinced the public of his threat to deterrence and security.  Moreover, 
critics deployed this rhetoric against Warnke to gain support for their coalition, displaying that 
their coalition believed U.S. strategic weakness undermined deterrence.  
 Newspaper assessments in February and March remained confident Warnke would 
receive enough votes to assume both arms positions,83 but this did not stop the heated debate.  
Many Senators expressed doubts about Warnke as the chief SALT negotiator, and Byrd admitted 
many found Warnke too “soft” on arms control.84  This skepticism stemmed from concerns about 
Warnke’s belief in the unimportance of Soviet superiority, a view one critic called “engagingly 
childlike,” and another characterized as having “little correlation with reality.”  Senator James 
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McClure (R, ID) asked, “Not believing that superiority matters, how can [Warnke] be expected 
to extract concessions from the Soviet Union in order to maintain a relative balance of forces?”85 
Nitze delivered the most forceful objection, disputing Warnke’s qualifications for both positions 
and calling Warnke a “patsy” who did not understand the meaning of superiority or 
equivalence.86  Senate debate appeared to descend into hairsplitting when Senators accused 
Warnke of doctoring a 1972 statement by dropping a comma before presenting it to the Senate.  
The Senators believed the original 1972 statement read as follows:  
“There is no purpose in either side’s achieving a numerical superiority, which is 
not translatable into either any sort of military capability or any sort of political 
potential.”87  
 
Without its comma, this statement meant superiority was useless unless it could be translated 
into political or military potential; with the comma, the statement meant superiority was useless 
altogether.88  Senators now doubted Warnke’s credibility and integrity, but this exchange also 
reveals an enduring belief in superiority’s importance, as well as the mobilization of a group 
convinced of nuclear weapons’ political utility even in an age of parity.  
 This criticism chipped away at some support for Warnke, but he was approved as ACDA 
director by 70 to 29 and as the chief SALT negotiator by only 58 to 40.89  Part of the success of 
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this vote can be attributed to Carter, who put his full support behind Warnke.  Carter assured 
reporters that he had “complete confidence” in Warnke, and called him “crucial to his 
administration.”90  By the March confirmation, Carter had personally called about a quarter of 
the Senate asking for their votes.91  Warnke also defended himself in the hearings, stressing his 
opposition to unilateral disarmament and reassuring Senators that he would negotiate arms 
control that preserved “rough equivalence.”92 He denied allegations that he stood for a 
philosophy based on the irrelevance of superiority, saying,  
“I don’t believe that I represent a fixed philosophical position on the issues of 
arms control.  I’m a strong advocate of arms control.  I’m also a strong advocate 
of a strong national defense.  I believe the two to be totally consistent and indeed, 
complementary.”93 
 
In the end, however, many Congressmen remained uneasy about Warnke’s appointment, and the 
debate had lasting ramifications for Carter’s nuclear policy.  First, those opposed to Warnke sent 
a clear signal that they would not accept any arms control treaty that did not favor the U.S. or 
that suggested any sort of unilateral restraint.  Less than two-thirds of the Senate voted for 
Warnke as the chief SALT negotiator, foreshadowing the contentious SALT II ratification 
debate.  Second, critics used rhetoric to mobilize a coalition against Carter; they argued Warnke 
would erode deterrence by permitting strategic inferiority, contradicting Carter’s professed 
commitment to a strong defense.  Their rhetoric spun Warnke’s position as unilateral 
disarmament and invoked fears of Soviet superiority, delegitimizing this position by framing it as 
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a threat to deterrence.  Moreover, this rhetoric delegitimized Carter’s arguments for restraint as 
he moved on from this incident; critics could now argue any restraint or force reductions would 
diminish the U.S.’s capability to deter. While Carter and Warnke wanted to focus on the issue of 
how many nuclear weapons the U.S. needed to ensure security, those opposed to Warnke instead 
focused on whether or not the U.S. would become inferior to the Soviet Union in terms of 
nuclear weapons, and therefore lose political or military leverage.  This rhetorical maneuvering 
represented a significant blow to Carter’s narrative, as critics tapped into fears of Soviet 
superiority to mobilize support for their narrative of parity.  Thus, Warnke had awakened a new 
hawkish coalition bent on undermining Carter’s nuclear agenda, and Carter would struggle to 
confront and silence this group throughout his term.   
 
Conclusion 
Carter entered office when the U.S. and Soviet Union had achieved strategic parity, an 
unsettled moment with no clear consequences for the future of U.S. foreign policy.  Carter tried 
to legitimate a narrative depicting parity as an opportunity to reassert the logic of MAD in the 
nuclear posture, while others legitimated a narrative of parity as a potential threat in light of 
incipient Soviet superiority.  These groups competed for their narratives to dominate public 
debate, justifying their agendas by appealing to the norms of deterrence.  The clash between 
these groups manifested in the debate over Warnke’s nomination, as critics broadened this debate 
to a discussion of nuclear weapons’ role in foreign policy.  Critics delegitimized Carter’s 
position of restraint in an age of parity by equating it with unilateral disarmament, which would 
erode the U.S. deterrent posture.  Carter failed to silence this opposition and allowed the 
mobilization of a coalition pushing for policies to deny Soviet superiority.  The next chapter will 





continued to mobilize and hijack Carter’s agenda in the public sphere by arguing Carter’s 








The MX and the SALT II Ratification Debate 
 
Senator Biden: It seems as though this committee is being prepared to accept the 
concept of nuclear superiority as having any relevance…it seems to me that 
nuclear superiority is a meaningless concept.94 
 
In January 1979, the Carter administration continued their negotiations with the Soviet 
Union towards a major strategic arms limitation treaty, as Carter expressed doubts about the need 
for new nuclear weapons programs like the MX missile.  Carter hoped SALT II would preserve 
parity, allowing the U.S. to maintain strategic forces equal to those of the Soviet Union and to 
maintain a stable strategic balance.95  As the administration finished negotiating the treaty, they 
continued to debate whether or not to accelerate development of the MX, the land-based ICBM 
that Carter privately called “nauseating” and “a gross waste of money.”96  By January 1980, 
however, Carter had withdrawn the SALT II treaty from consideration on the Senate floor and 
approved the development of the MX, seemingly abandoning his campaign commitments to 
arms control and forestalling new nuclear programs. Why did Carter approve the MX, and why 
did SALT II fail? 
Scholars have identified both SALT and the MX as key milestones in Carter’s 
“hardening” nuclear policy, but most previous accounts have focused only on either the failure of 
SALT II or the MX decision.97  Although the administration wanted their audience to consider 
these issues separately, debates about U.S. forces and the strategic balance at this time almost 
always considered both issues together as they captured both public and elite attention.  As such, 
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I first describe the events leading up to the MX decision and the signing of SALT II, as well as 
the rhetoric during the ratification debate.  Next, I demonstrate how Carter struggled to 
legitimate SALT II on its own terms, as critics of the treaty invoked fears of Soviet superiority in 
their legitimation to mobilize a coalition against Carter.  Then I show that while perceptions of 
an increasing Soviet threat partially influenced the fate of MX and SALT II, they cannot explain 
why Carter waited to approve the MX or why he could not sell SALT to domestic audiences.  
Additionally, hostile domestic public opinion pressured Carter to successfully legitimate his 
decisions, but his policy shift stemmed from his inability to shift these perceptions and influence 
public opinion.  Overall, I argue Carter initially tried to justify signing SALT II and halting the 
MX program based on ideas about the stability of parity and a reduced role for nuclear weapons 
in national security.  The public nature of the debate allowed critics to gain visibility and support 
as they warned SALT II would undermine deterrence.  Carter shifted his rhetoric to that of 
essential equivalence and approved the MX, but these measures failed to silence critics.  This 
legitimation veered closer to that of Carter’s critics, broadened debate beyond the treaty itself, 
and empowered critics to call for defense measures championing nuclear weapons as an essential 
component of national security.  Carter could not refocus the debate and return to his original 
narrative of parity, allowing critics to hijack his initial vision and doom the SALT II treaty.    
 
“A Strange Arms Debate”: MX, SALT II, and the Search for Essential Equivalence 
 As the Soviet Union grew its ICBM force and approached strategic parity with the U.S. 
in the late 1960s, some U.S. policymakers expressed an interest in arms control to limit future 
force buildups.  When the Soviet Union developed an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense 
system, which undermined MAD by allowing Moscow to potentially survive a U.S. nuclear 





successor, Richard Nixon, and the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev shared this interest in 
SALT, and they signed the first SALT agreement on May 27, 1972.  This agreement placed a 
freeze on existing numbers of SLBMs and ICBMs and limited the number of each country’s 
ABM sites.98  The initial SALT talks did not include limits on MIRVs, so both sides could still 
affix multiple warheads to a single missile.  After Nixon signed the first SALT treaty, 
negotiations for SALT II began in November of that year with two broad goals: agreeing on 
reduced but equal numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and constraining future 
qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons.  
While the Nixon and Ford administrations made significant progress on these talks with 
the Soviets, several issues remained unresolved, specifically the issues of counting the Soviet 
Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles in the countries’ permitted delivery vehicle totals.99  
When Carter entered office, he sprung into action to uphold his campaign promises of arms 
control.  He immediately moved to revive negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), which would ban all nuclear testing.100  In March 1977, Carter sent Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance to deliver to the Soviet Union a “comprehensive proposal” for SALT II.  The 
proposal included: a reduction in total strategic launchers from 2400 to 1800-1200; cuts in large 
Soviet ICBMs from 308 to 150; a limit of 550 MIRVed ICBMs on each side; a ban on new 
ICBMs; and a range limit of 2500 km on all mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles.101  Vance also 
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brought a backup proposal similar to a more modest framework agreed upon in 1974 at 
Vladivostok, USSR.  The comprehensive proposal outraged the Soviet negotiators, who 
disparaged Carter for announcing the proposal publicly before telling them and argued the 
greater burden to reduce forces fell on the Soviet Union.102  This significantly hampered 
negotiation, as the Soviet Union refused to even consider the Vladivostok proposal after 
receiving Vance’s comprehensive proposal.  Vance would travel back for nine additional 
negotiation sessions before the two sides finally compromised to accommodate both the 
Vladivostok proposal and Carter’s desire for more reductions. The final treaty, signed in Vienna 
on June 18, 1979, included, among other components, and equal aggregate limit of 1320 total 
launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles, and 
an equal aggregate limit of 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers.103 
During these negotiations, the Carter administration devised plans to sell the SALT II 
treaty to the public and Congress.  As early as May 1977, the White House communications team 
crafted a public strategy for SALT II, including hosting town halls and having the State 
Department create a SALT film, to prevent critics from monopolizing Senate commentary.104  
Carter’s White House Communications Director, Jerry Rafshoon, advised Carter to make the 
case for SALT by emphasizing SALT’s merits on its own terms: it allowed equal numbers of 
weapons for both sides, and without SALT II, the U.S. would continue a wasteful, dangerous 
arms race with the Soviet Union.  If Carter presented the treaty as a means of strengthening 
national defense, the debate would “revolve around numbers, strategies and weapons systems 
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that the public will never understand. The confusion and doubt created could very well endanger 
the treaty.”105 Throughout the negotiations, Carter’s public speech highlighted the treaty’s 
inherent value as a means to maintain deterrence by preventing an arms race. 
 Before negotiations had even concluded, however, a coalition including Congressmen 
from both parties, interest groups, and the Pentagon began to mobilize against the treaty.  They 
argued the treaty would destroy the state of parity, codify Soviet strategic superiority, and erode 
the U.S. deterrent posture.  Senate hardliners, led by long-time arms control critic Henry 
Jackson, asserted that an agreement based on numerical equality would still permit Soviet 
qualitative advantages; these advantages would lead to Soviet superiority and permit Soviet 
coercive power over the U.S.106 The JCS warned that failure to address issues like the Backfire 
bomber would give the Soviet Union a military advantage, and they hoped the U.S. could retain 
a mobile missile in the negotiations to preserve essential equivalence.107  Finally, dozens of 
interest groups organized against SALT II—by December 1978, 68 organizations had formed to 
fight SALT ratification.108  The most prominent of these, the American Security Council (ASC) 
and Nitze’s Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), distributed publications predicting 
impending Soviet superiority.  They worried the treaty would restrict the U.S. from bolstering its 
ICBM capabilities and leave the Soviet Union with a greater number of missiles, claiming the 
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Soviets would be able to destroy the majority of U.S. forces in a first strike.109  These groups, 
along with the anti-SALT Congressmen, also wanted to link the success or failure of SALT II to 
Soviet behavior in Africa, refusing to cooperate with the Soviet Union on arms control so long as 
they continued to interfere in the Horn of Africa.  They argued the U.S. should only enter 
agreements with a cooperative Soviet Union; otherwise, the U.S. would further encourage Soviet 
aggression, allowing the Soviet Union to diminish U.S. power and prestige in its pursuit of a 
communist world order.110  Carter and Vance resisted this “linkage,” urging Senators to consider 
SALT on its own terms separate from other aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.111   
As the Carter administration negotiated SALT II amidst this debate, they also began to 
discuss the fate of the MX, the land-based MIRVed ICBM capable of carrying up to ten nuclear 
warheads.  The Air Force began developing the weapon in 1971 after discovering Soviet plans 
for the SS-18, a MIRVed heavy ICBM carrying up to ten warheads; the Air Force feared the 
Soviets could launch a devastating attack on U.S. forces with a few of these missiles and still 
have reserve forces to continue a nuclear war.  Meanwhile, the U.S. possessed only the 
Minuteman III ICBM, which could only carry three warheads.  Addressing these concerns, the 
Pentagon designed the MX to survive a surprise Soviet attack and retaliate against hardened 
enemy silos with a high degree of accuracy.  In fact, the MX had a Circular Error Probable 
(CEP) of 0.06 nautical miles, making it twice as accurate as the Minuteman III, and it had 
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increased HTK capability to strike hardened military facilities.112 These features led some critics 
to denounce the MX as a first-strike weapon, arguing a weapon with the capability to knock out 
almost all Soviet ICBMs would only encourage a preemptive Soviet strike.  Because of the MX’s 
significant offensive capability and its ability to strike military targets, critics warned the MX 
would reverse the U.S.’s MAD strategic doctrine by moving away from a strictly retaliatory 
capability.113 
Since the MX aimed to address a perceived U.S. ICBM vulnerability problem, the 
administration’s internal debate about the MX focused on its basing mode—the type of silo in 
which the missile would be placed—and its size.  The Department of Defense could either build 
a smaller missile to fit on submarines or a larger stand-alone missile.  They also considered a 
variety of basing modes, including hardened fixed silos or different types of mobile basing.  The 
Ford administration tentatively settled on a tunnel-based mobile basing system and allotted $294 
million for the MX in the FY1978 Defense Budget, with a proposed increase to $1533 million in 
FY1979.114  Upon entering office, however, Carter expressed doubts about the MX, and his 
administration was divided on the issue.  Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, and William 
Perry, Undersecretary for Research and Engineering, worried the MX’s HTK capability would 
create incentives for a Soviet first strike, while Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 
believed Carter needed the MX to solve the ICBM vulnerability problem in light of intelligence 
reports about the increasing accuracy of Soviet missiles.115   
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In Carter’s revision of the FY1978 Defense budget, he cut $160 million from the MX 
program and announced he would wait until December 1978 to make a final decision on the 
program’s future.116  In the interim, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy 
Frank Press led a study of the MX and its basing modes, finding the Air Force overstated the 
threat to the Minuteman III.  Carter subsequently stalled MX production again; the 
administration added only $24.2 million to the previous year’s allotment of $134 million, 
keeping the missile in an advanced research and development stage. Brown announced Carter 
would make his official decision on the MX in April 1979.117   
In early 1978, the Soviets began testing new guidance systems to increase missile 
accuracy, generating greater alarm in the Pentagon even as Brown insisted, “We face no 
immediate crisis.”118  These Soviet developments did, however, launch a flurry of basing mode 
studies to solve the perceived ICBM vulnerability problem—the Department of Defense and 
contractors studied nearly 40 basing options.  By April 1979, they had narrowed their options 
down to six: an air-mobile system placing 100 ICBMs on aircraft ready to launch on warning; a 
free mobile system moving ICBMs on trucks over interstate highways; Multiple Protective 
Shelter (MPS) basing, deploying 200 ICBMs among numerous Multiple Aim Point (MAP) 
shelters; improvements to existing Minuteman silos; or a program strengthening the other legs of 
the triad and decreasing reliance on ICBMs.119 
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As the SALT II negotiations neared completion, a National Security Council (NSC) 
committee held three meetings in May 1979 to decide on the future of the MX.  They relied on a 
report by Seymour Zeiberg, Perry’s deputy, which argued that neither the “minimum 
modernization” of the Minuteman silos nor the refocusing to other areas of the triad would 
maintain essential equivalence.  They arrived at two policy alternatives: an MPS system moving 
200 MXs among 800 hardened silos while retaining 300 Minuteman IIIs in their existing silos, or 
developing a smaller missile to fit both Minuteman III silos and Ohio-class submarines.  The Air 
Force and JCS strongly opposed the latter option, since the smaller missile could carry fewer 
warheads.120 Carter met with the NSC on June 4, but he complained that Brzezinski was 
“jamming a decision down his throat.”  Although Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield 
Turner believed the MX would encourage arms racing, most advisors supported MX deployment 
to some extent.121  Carter approved the MX on June 8, choosing the largest missile variant: a 
190,000-pound, 92-inch diameter missile capable of carrying up to ten 335-kiloton warheads.122   
Just days later, on June 18, Carter and Brezhnev signed SALT II in Geneva and Carter 
submitted the treaty to the Senate for consideration.  As criticism of SALT reached a crescendo, 
Carter shifted his rhetoric in justifying the treaty.  This new legitimation assured that Carter 
would maintain “essential equivalence”—defined by Brown as preventing Soviet nuclear forces 
from becoming instruments of political leverage—by incorporating both the MX and SALT into 
overall national security strategy.123  For example, in February 1979, the White House 
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Communications staff and the NSC carefully planned Carter’s framing of SALT II in a speech at 
the Georgia Institute of Technology: they still wanted to emphasize the merits of arms control, 
but they hoped to deflect criticism by framing SALT as an enhancement to overall defense 
strategy.124  In the speech, Carter asserted SALT would permit weapons like the MX to “reverse 
the Soviet’s numerical advantage.”125  On the opening day of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations hearings on SALT II, both Vance and Brown opened their arguments by stating SALT 
II would maintain essential equivalence, and that the U.S. would authorize the MX and other 
programs to prevent Soviet superiority and therefore maintain deterrence.126  
Although critics appreciated Carter’s decision to approve the MX, they still voiced fierce 
opposition to SALT II.  Senators introduced dozens of amendments to the treaty, many requiring 
the administration to approve additional defense programs.  The same coalition of Congressmen 
and interest groups continued to cast doubts about U.S. ability to deny Soviet superiority.  For 
example, Nitze testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations that even with the MX, 
Carter’s overall defense program would not deny Soviet strategic advantages, referencing the 
importance of U.S. superiority in its leverage in the Berlin and Cuban crises.127  While Jackson 
maintained his opposition to the treaty, Senator Sam Nunn (D, GA) took up his mantle to lead 
the bipartisan Congressional opposition during the floor debate.  His apprehension about U.S. 
ability to meet the Soviet threat had previously led him to call for increased defense budgets, but 
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now he tied his vote for SALT to guarantees from Carter of 5 percent annual increases.128  Carter 
continued to cite the MX as evidence that he would prevent Soviet superiority, but he began to 
face backlash from pro-SALT Senators, who criticized Carter’s decision on the MX and accused 
him of pandering to the more hawkish Senators.129   
Meanwhile, the administration did not decide on an MX basing mode until September, 
eventually settling on a road-mobile horizontal shelter system where 200 MXs moved between 
4600 shelters in Utah and Nevada.130  The SALT debate wore on, and on October 10, 1979, 
Carter agreed to the Byrd-Cranston compromise, a five-year commitment to increased defense 
spending with the provision that SALT III must make meaningful progress on arms control.131  
Yet by December, Carter still likely lacked the two-thirds Senate support required for 
ratification.132  Carter pulled the treaty from the floor on January 3, 1980, after the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan.133  On the MX front, the administration began trying to gain the support of 
citizens of Utah and Nevada to build the new basing system, a battle that would continue to 
plague the Reagan administration.  By the time Carter left office, he had thrown his full support 
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Rhetoric, Coalitions, and the SALT and MX Decisions 
Throughout the MX and SALT II debates, various coalitions within and outside the 
administration scrambled to legitimate their desired programs, often justifying their choices as a 
means to maintain parity as they tried to undermine support for the opposing view.  In the 
process, Carter approved the MX but could not garner enough support for SALT II in the Senate.  
Why did Carter ultimately tie the MX to his legitimation of SALT, and why did critics 
successfully mobilize against Carter to prevent SALT II ratification?  I argue Carter’s initial 
legitimation of SALT II as a means to reduce arms racing and preserve stability was ineffective 
because critics feared the treaty would lead to U.S. strategic inferiority.  The administration 
announced the MX decision to reinforce its new legitimation of SALT II as a means to preserve 
essential equivalence in response to these concerns.  This new rhetoric, however, broadened the 
scope of debate about the treaty and empowered critics to call for additional arms buildups, 
mobilizing a coalition to undermine SALT II.  
Carter’s initial legitimation of SALT II focused on preventing arms racing and preserving 
numerical equality, separating the treaty from other national security concerns.  Carter’s calls for 
substantial arms reductions and even a freeze on modernization demonstrated his vision of parity 
as a moment of mutual stability and the perfect opportunity to reduce the role of nuclear weapons 
in foreign policy.134  As he sent Vance and Warnke to the negotiations, he described the 
importance of arms control to “reduce the arms race…thus ending with rough parity on both 
sides.”135  Carter’s communications team encouraged him to discuss SALT on its own terms as a 
major milestone in arms control, rather than a means to strengthen national defense.  As stated 
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earlier, Carter and Vance also discouraged linkage between SALT and U.S.-Soviet cooperation 
in other areas.  This type of legitimation, consistent with an optimistic narrative of parity, 
endorsed a MAD nuclear posture by promoting the idea that the U.S. could only use nuclear 
weapons for deterrence.  Carter divorced SALT II from broader issues in the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship because the reduction of nuclear weapons only affected nuclear policy and the U.S. 
deterrent posture. 
This mode of legitimation, however, did not prevent critics from mobilizing against the 
treaty.  These critics linked the prevention of Soviet superiority to ensuring overall U.S. national 
security, implying nuclear superiority afforded some political leverage. They advanced the 
narrative that parity left the U.S. in a tenuous position and an unfair SALT agreement would 
destroy the existing balance.  Hardliners in Congress asked, “If the Soviets are permitted to gain 
strategic superiority with or without SALT II, why [is] a treaty required to formalize the 
situation?”136  Critics attacked rhetoric touting SALT II’s preservation of numerical equality, 
arguing the treaty still allowed Soviet qualitative advantages.  Therefore, the treaty allowed 
Soviet superiority and would threaten the U.S. deterrent capability.  If the Soviet Union believed 
it could win a nuclear war, SALT II needed to guarantee a parity ensuring the U.S. could deny 
any chance of Soviet victory.  As such, these critics almost universally called for the 
development of new weapons systems like the MX.  In their view, parity meant the U.S. had to 
limit Soviet advantages while strengthening and improving U.S. forces to maintain some sort of 
leverage.  Brown later summarized this case for the MX, saying the U.S. needed the MX to 
maintain parity in the military balance for the future.137  The huge spike in anti-SALT interest 
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groups before June 1979 suggests this rhetoric did successfully mobilize people against the 
treaty, especially domestic elites.  Critics’ accusations that Carter would permit U.S. strategic 
inferiority seemed particularly damaging to Carter’s legitimation, since they implied SALT II 
would afford Soviet coercive power over the U.S. and threaten the U.S.’s ability to defend itself.  
As Carter struggled to reconcile these accusations with his commitment to defense, his vocal 
critics dominated public discourse about the treaty. 
Carter’s shift to SALT II legitimation based on essential equivalence represents a 
rhetorical maneuver to quiet this criticism, and it correlated with his decision to approve the MX. 
It is true that the MX decision occurred after the JCS began expressing concerns about the 
increasing Soviet threat and the state of the U.S. ICBM force; the JCS advocated ICBMs’ 
importance for security and future bargaining leverage.  While Carter sometimes assured them he 
would proceed with programs like the MX, the JCS staunchly refuted the idea that they tied their 
support for SALT II to promises of ICBM modernization.138 Additionally, David Jones, 
Chairman of the JCS, had called for a mobile missile as early as July 1978,139 but Carter did not 
approve the MX until June 1979.  The MX approval may have partly derived from these 
domestic trade-offs among bureaucracies, but the timing of the MX decision suggests it was part 
of a larger strategy to build a coalition of support for SALT II, a coalition that included the JCS.  
While the administration dismissed portrayals of the MX as just a bargaining chip to buy 
Senators and secure SALT ratification, there is some evidence they recognized MX’s utility in 
legitimating and building support for SALT II.  The MX could demonstrate to SALT skeptics 
that the U.S. would continue making qualitative improvements to its arsenal, preventing Soviet 
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advantages and maintaining deterrence even with additional arms control measures.  Both Brown 
and Carter admitted there were both strategic and political motives for approving the MX; Brown 
said they needed to show the U.S. audience that the Soviets would not have a political edge 
under SALT II, and he admitted they would have struggled to secure SALT ratification without 
the MX.140  Moreover, Madeleine Albright described in a memo to Brzezinski that while SALT 
critics wanted the MX decision to make the treaty more palatable, even the pro-SALT Senators 
wanted an MX decision before Carter signed the treaty so as not to be seen as buying off 
hardliners.141 At a time when SALT criticism dominated public debate, the administration saw 
the MX decision as a tool to build consensus by winning over SALT II skeptics.      
Regardless of the precise reasons for approving the MX, the decision linked the 
legitimation of both SALT and MX together in the administration’s rhetoric, allowing the 
administration to argue SALT II maintained essential equivalence.  Essential equivalence meant 
showing the Soviets that “they have no prospect of gaining meaningful superiority over us.”142  It 
is unclear what constituted “meaningful” superiority, but this rhetoric aimed to counter critics’ 
arguments that SALT II would enshrine Soviet superiority and consequently erode U.S. 
deterrence.  Carter needed to tie SALT II to overall defense strategy to show it would not 
threaten national security; linking the MX to this legitimation afforded him additional credibility 
as the MX demonstrated an active step toward denying Soviet superiority.  Carter also signed 
                                                
140 “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Carter's New World; Interview with Harold Brown, 1987 [1],” 03/26/1987, 
WGBH Media Library & Archives, 
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_7C627EF675ED4300AD2DA8A705BE1F42; “War and Peace in the Nuclear 
Age; Missile Experimental; Interview with Jimmy Carter, 1987,” 01/27/1987, WGBH Media Library & Archives, 
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_332175FFE7084DEDA75E815B914A6192. 
141 Memo, Madeleine Albright to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 6/2/79, NSA 22—Press and Congressional Relations Files, 
“Weekly Reports 6-8/79,” Box 2, JCL; see also Memo, David Aaron to Charles Duncan, n.d., Brzezinski donated 
material, “Serial Xs (9/78-12/78), Box 36, JCL. Many Senators tied their votes on SALT to MX approval; see for 
example Boren, Danforth, Deconcini, and Warner, Caldwell Donated Material, “Evaluations of Senators Positions 
[1]” and “Evaluation of Senators Positions [2],” Box 10, JCL.  
142 “Talking Points on MX Decision,” n.d., Congressional Liaison Office, “MX Missile Correspondence, 5/9/79-





PD-50 in August, stating that all future arms control must “contribute to achieving our defense 
and force posture goals.”143  The essential equivalence rhetoric was multivocal legitimation: the 
administration also argued that approving the MX would allow for future arms reductions.144  
This rhetoric placated existing SALT supporters and placed the overall strategy within norms of 
deterrence by demonstrating essential equivalence did not mean the U.S. sought nuclear 
superiority.  For the most part, however, the rhetorical shift toward essential equivalence co-
opted critics’ negative view of parity to delegitimize SALT II opposition, showing SALT II and 
the MX could prevent encroaching Soviet superiority.  This rhetoric signaled a major departure 
from Carter’s previous vision of nuclear weapons and advanced an entirely different narrative 
about parity.  It is unclear if Carter himself believed this narrative as he decided to approve the 
MX, so his legitimation likely aimed to repudiate accusations that SALT II appeased the Soviet 
Union and undermined deterrence, thus silencing the anti-SALT coalition. 
At first, this rhetoric seemed to quiet some critics, and the administration believed they 
were making a successful case for SALT.145  By placing SALT within the broader national 
defense, however, Carter only further empowered critics to tie their support for SALT to 
guarantees of additional defense buildups.  Even with the administration’s new legitimation, 
these critics continued the same type of attacks accusing Carter of weakening deterrence and 
national security.  The Committee on Foreign Relations called Nitze, whom Vance deemed the 
most damaging voice to the ratification campaign, to testify, and he spoke within the bounds of 
parity set by the administration rather than calling for U.S. superiority.  Citing Brown and 
Vance’s framing of the SALT issue, Nitze characterized the SALT debate as a debate about 
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whether the U.S. would “do those things which are necessary to keep the Soviets from getting 
[superiority].”146  Nitze’s denunciation helped shift the debate further away from the treaty itself 
and toward broader criticisms of Carter’s defense policy; his and Lt. Gen. Edward Rowny’s 
objections dominated media coverage of the first week of SALT hearings.147  Nunn’s rhetoric 
also amplified this shift, as he tied SALT to his concrete plans to augment defense expenditures 
beyond the MX.  While Nunn also claimed to accept parity, he believed the U.S. had been 
“tranquilized” into thinking parity would continue without changing the current spending 
patterns.148  Nunn’s position mobilized a coalition; by December 1979 Nunn led a group of 19 
Senators in a letter to Carter worried about the slipping U.S. military position under SALT.149   
Why did Carter fail to prevent the growth of this coalition against him, even when he 
shifted his rhetoric to deflect criticism?  First, Carter had lost credibility in the eyes of Senators 
and the public as he struggled with other foreign policy crises in areas like the Horn of Africa 
and Nicaragua.  Even as Carter tried to go on the rhetorical “offensive” and take control of the 
SALT debate, skeptics did not believe his assurances that SALT would bolster national security 
amidst other national security failures.  Second, the administration’s rhetoric broadened the 
SALT debate and gave critics’ similar rhetoric more legitimacy.  Although they claimed the MX 
development would lead to more substantial arms reductions, the administration’s justification of 
the MX as necessary to maintain the strategic balance lent credence to the narrative of parity as a 
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potential threat and that the U.S. needed to add more weapons to maintain it.  This apparent 
embrace of their narrative empowered critics: they took their cue from the administration’s 
legitimation of SALT maintaining essential equivalence to critique the administration for not 
maintaining essential equivalence across its defense policy.  They now had a range of issues on 
which to attack Carter and in turn weaken the case for the treaty, while the administration had to 
spend time and energy quieting concerns about other policies instead of SALT.  Critics’ rhetoric 
continued to effectively mobilize people by arguing the MX would still not prevent U.S. 
inferiority after SALT II.  It became difficult for Carter to return to his original narrative and 
refocus this debate on the treaty itself because these critics used his own rhetoric of essential 
equivalence—silencing their arguments would require reneging on this rhetoric and 
delegitimizing the treaty even further. 
By August 1979, the administration was losing control of the SALT narrative; observers 
like Senator Joe Biden (D, DE) noted how the debate had shifted to the U.S.’s overall strategic 
position and away from the treaty itself.150  Carter’s coalition of support further deteriorated 
throughout the debate, especially after the discovery of Soviet troops in Cuba.  Critics linked this 
incident to SALT, portraying it as an indicator of increasing Soviet aggression and the need for 
the U.S. to get tough on defense.  When Carter tried to separate the event from SALT, critics 
called him a “gullible pacifist.”151  Carter had already linked SALT to the overall strategic 
balance by emphasizing essential equivalence, so now trying to separate SALT from the strategic 
environment created an image of appeasing the Soviets.  Further, such separation would refute 
the idea that nuclear weapons were essential to other areas of national security, an idea Carter 
                                                
150 Congressional Record, 96th Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980), 2264. 
151 Robert G. Kaiser, “Carter’s Speech May Have Cost SALT Some Ground in the Senate,” The Washington Post, 
October 3, 1979. For additional coverage, see Don Oberdorfer, “A Small Soviet Brigade and Its Large 





had implicitly accepted in his shift to the rhetoric of essential equivalence.  This rhetorical pivot 
to his critics’ conception of parity also alienated SALT supporters; Senators like George 
McGovern (D, SD) saw the MX as escalating the arms race by moving toward a first-strike 
capability and grew alarmed that arms control would accompany a “shopping list” of weapons to 
maintain equivalence.152  By the time Carter pulled the treaty from the Senate, support had 
waned to the point where he likely lacked the two-thirds majority required for its approval.  
Thus, rhetoric initially meant to win support for SALT had backfired and empowered critics to 
gain support for weapons modernization and acquisition.  
 
International Politics, SALT II, and the MX 
Some might refute the above analysis by arguing that the strategic balance and 
perceptions of the Soviet threat prompted Carter to approve the MX and doomed SALT II.  If 
changes in the strategic balance primarily caused Carter to proceed with the MX and pull SALT 
II from Senate consideration, the Soviet Union would have made significant strides in either 
weapons development or geopolitical influence.  Such moves toward Soviet superiority would 
have prompted the Carter administration to take these steps toward U.S. nuclear superiority.  
This international politics theory partly explains the SALT II decision; perceptions of Soviet 
superiority clearly influenced SALT critics’ thinking.  In terms of geopolitical influence, the 
Soviets did engage in some acts of “aggression” in 1978-1979 that increased U.S. perceptions of 
a Soviet threat.  Auten notes several significant actions, including concerns about the increased 
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, Soviet-backed South Yemen’s invasion of pro-U.S. 
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North Yemen, and later the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba.153  Critics often tried to link other 
Soviet actions to consideration of the SALT treaty.  In particular, SALT critics pointed to the 
Soviet troops in Cuba as a reason to distrust the Soviet Union and retreat from cooperation 
through SALT.  At the same time, Carter still had the agency to placate concerns and convince 
skeptics to vote for SALT, so this theory cannot explain why domestic actors successfully 
mounted their opposition to the treaty.   
Until summer 1979, Carter did not tie other tensions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship to his 
faith in arms control, as he insisted on considering the SALT II treaty on its own terms. One 
exception occurred in March 1978, after weeks of Soviet advisors aiding Ethiopian and Cuban 
troops against Somalia.  Carter delivered an unusually stern speech, threatening that a lack of 
Soviet restraint in local conflicts could threaten SALT II.154  Although these actions could have 
spurred Carter to advance strategic weapons programs to gain leverage and curb Soviet 
interventions, the speech seems to be an anomaly.  Critics grew frustrated that Carter made this 
speech only to back off from its tough rhetoric almost immediately.155  After summer 1979, some 
might use the fact that Carter explicitly pulled the treaty after the invasion of Afghanistan as 
evidence that Carter abandoned arms control after finally realizing the Soviets’ belligerence.  
Carter knew this action doomed the treaty, but he did not lose faith in SALT even after this act of 
Soviet aggression.  In his letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, Carter wrote, “I continue 
to share your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States 
and the entire world.”156  Based on Carter’s previous commitment to arms control, there is reason 
to believe he was sincere in his hope for the future of SALT.  The administration also continued 
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its plans for SALT III;157 Soviet aggression did not seem to upset the plans for the next round of 
arms reductions or Carter’s aspirations for arms control.  While perceptions of the Soviet Union 
influenced the SALT II debate, Soviet actions alone cannot account for Carter’s failure to sell his 
arms control goals.  
Similarly, Soviet weapons developments partly explain the MX decision, but Carter’s 
reticence and timing of the MX approval suggest his decision stemmed from an interest in 
influencing domestic opinions about his nuclear policy.  The U.S.-Soviet military balance 
initially provided the impetus for the development of the MX; the Air Force worried about 
matching Soviet MIRVed missile capability in the early 1970s, and between 1975 and 1979, the 
Soviets added more heavy SS-18 ICBMs as they phased out older models.158  This fear of the 
U.S.’s “ICBM vulnerability problem” persisted through the Carter administration, and 
proponents saw the mobile MX as the best way to counter Soviet weapons developments.159  The 
1978 and 1979 National Intelligence Estimates also expressed mild alarm at Soviet capabilities, 
saying Soviet ICBMs were more accurate than expected and increasingly capable of hitting the 
majority of U.S. Minuteman silos.160  This perception may have generated more urgency to 
develop the MX, as the Pentagon began studying MX basing modes.  At the same time, however, 
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the intelligence estimates also reported that Soviet modernization was continuing as expected, so 
there was not necessarily a major uptick in Soviet weapons development during this period.  The 
administration still moved forward with basing mode studies based on some individuals’ belief 
in Minuteman vulnerability, but they lacked consensus on the urgency of this vulnerability 
problem.161  Carter did not appear so alarmed at Soviet weapons developments, as he still felt his 
advisors were forcing him to make a decision.  In the end, Carter approved the MX days before 
signing SALT II; instead of delaying the decision further, he approved the missile before 
choosing a basing mode, the main focus of the Pentagon studies.  Moreover, if Carter had made 
the MX decision purely based on concerns about vulnerability, he would have chosen the smaller 
missile that could fit on submarines to achieve optimal survivability.162  The particular MX 
decision, as well as its timing, suggests Carter aimed to convey a specific message to both Soviet 
and domestic audiences about his commitment to deterrence in an age of parity.    
While it is ultimately difficult to delineate the precise reasons for the approval of the MX 
and the failure of SALT II, international politics seem to have had a moderate effect on Carter’s 
policy choices.  This explanation alone, however, does not elucidate why Carter announced his 
MX decision when he did, nor why he could not stem the rising tide of SALT opposition.  
 
Domestic Politics, SALT II, and the MX 
Others might argue that Carter faced a public and Congress skeptical of arms control and 
pushing for measures like the MX to regain superiority; Carter capitulated to their demands in 
his MX and SALT decisions.  Rather than public opinion directly influencing Carter's nuclear 
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policy choices, however, domestic elites tried to influence public opinion as they legitimated 
their desired strategies.  This does not mean that the administration completely disregarded 
public sentiment about the treaty.  For instance, one memo from the White House 
Communications team expressed concern about declining public support for SALT, “Especially 
if [these trends] reflect what Senators are hearing during the recess.”163  Congressmen listened to 
their constituents, so the administration worried the portion of the public with strong opinions on 
SALT could influence their Senators.  Additionally, domestic hostility toward the SALT II treaty 
and Carter himself made it difficult for Carter to win public support for SALT II.  Domestic 
support for Carter as a President had peaked in spring 1977 at a 75 percent approval rating, but 
by the time Carter signed SALT II and brought it to the Senate, he had reached some of his all-
time lowest approval ratings of around 29 percent.164  Concurrently, Carter faced an increasing 
disapproval of his policies in Congress, making some Senators reluctant to cooperate on SALT.  
The Carter administration had used some of its political capital lobbying moderate Republicans 
to vote for the Panama Canal treaties in 1978, and some of those cooperative Senators feared 
their reelection prospects if they also voted for SALT II.165  Thus, this hostile domestic 
environment made securing approval of any foreign policy decision a challenge for Carter.  
Ultimately, this hostile domestic environment may not have brought about SALT II’s 
demise; rather, the declining SALT II public approval suggests its failure came from Carter’s 
inability to influence public opinion.  An early SALT poll taken in November 1978 found 42 
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percent in favor and 20 percent opposed.  By the time Carter signed the treaty, these numbers 
had fallen to about 33 percent in favor and 24 percent opposed.  Public support continued to 
plummet; by October 1979, the numbers dropped to 24 percent favoring and 26 percent opposed.  
Common concerns among the public included a lack of trust in the Soviets to reciprocate arms 
reductions, and the fear that the treaty would give the Soviets a strategic advantage over the 
U.S.166 This suggests Carter’s opponents were more successful at mobilizing public opposition 
against SALT.  More notable, however, is the amount of people who did not have a strong 
opinion about SALT.  Of those polled in March 1979, 69 percent did not know enough about 
SALT to pass judgment.  Although the Carter administration planned a massive publicity 
campaign to sell SALT, by July 1979, 58 percent of the public was still uninformed about 
SALT.167  This public indifference could have hindered Carter’s ability to silence his very vocal 
critics before and during the ratification debate, and it also demonstrates Carter’s inability to 
mobilize a coalition in favor of SALT II. 
As support for SALT declined, the influence of anti-SALT interest groups grew; while 
their rhetoric likely helped fuel the mobilization against Carter, it is less clear that they directly 
influenced his policy decisions.  The ASC and CPD, the largest of these groups, believed the 
U.S. should regain nuclear superiority.  They distributed pamphlets and created anti-SALT film, 
and one survey of Congressional aides found these groups lobbied over half the Senate to sway 
votes against SALT.168  The CPD had been lobbying the Carter administration for some time,169 
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so Carter undoubtedly felt pressure to approve the MX and many Senators felt their pressure to 
reject SALT II.  It is difficult, however, to assess the actual influence of these groups on either 
public or Senatorial opinion; the same study of Congressional aides found aides universally 
denied that interest groups had any sway on Senators’ votes.170  Further, Carter’s actual decisions 
do not correspond with these groups’ precise demands; the CPD wanted Carter to renegotiate a 
better SALT agreement and to deploy Minuteman missiles in mobile basing systems in the 
interim during MX development.171  Specific pressures from these groups did not seem to factor 
into the decision to proceed with the MX just before the SALT debate.  Rather, Carter considered 
the broader domestic debates about these programs when he attempted to justify SALT and his 
MX approval.  Carter may not have shifted his policy choices in direct response to the demands 
of public opinion, but Carter’s failure to influence this public opinion through his legitimation 
hindered his ability to silence his critics and successfully build a coalition in support of SALT II. 
 
Conclusion 
 The public SALT II debate opened up space in U.S. domestic politics to debate the 
meaning of parity, the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy, and the future of U.S. nuclear 
acquisitions.  Carter initially hoped to halt the MX program and sell the SALT II treaty to the 
public and domestic elites on its own terms, taking advantage of parity’s stability to reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons in overall defense planning.  The public nature of the debate, however, 
allowed his critics to gain increased visibility as they argued the treaty would enshrine Soviet 
strategic superiority and therefore erode deterrence.  Carter approved the MX and shifted his 
                                                                                                                                                       
Groups on the Senate’s Consideration of SALT II,” 11/18/82, in Caldwell Donated Material, “SALT II 
Ratification,” Box 8, JCL. 
169 Letter from E.R. Zumwalt to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 8/13/77, NSA 15 – Office Files, “Chron 8/1-12/77,” Box 67, 
JCL. 
170 Kurkowski, “Impact of Interest Groups on the Senate’s Consideration of SALT II.” 





legitimation, instead justifying SALT and a crucial component of overall national security and 
assuring critics he would maintain essential equivalence.  This rhetoric only reinforced critics’ 
conception of U.S. defense policy in an age of parity, granting them additional legitimacy and 
allowing them to continue their mobilization while shifting public debate further away from the 
treaty itself.  By the time Carter pulled SALT II from Senate consideration, he had lost control of 
his original narrative and set the U.S. down a different path of nuclear policy, one based around 








PD-59 and the Making of Nuclear Superiority 
 
Senator Glenn: I get lost in what is credible and not credible. This whole thing 
gets so incredible when you consider wiping out whole nations, it is difficult to 
establish credibility. 
Secretary Brown: That is why we sound a little crazy when we talk about it.172 
 
When Carter entered office, he believed parity reinforced the balance of terror such that 
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union could accept the stability of a MAD deterrent posture.  He 
denounced the idea of limited nuclear options against military targets, doubting such an 
exchange could remain limited.  By the end of his term, however, Carter signed PD-59, a nuclear 
employment policy designed to ensure the Soviet Union had no chance of victory in a nuclear 
exchange.  PD-59 stated that in the event of nuclear war, the U.S. “must be capable of fighting 
successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are 
unacceptable.”173  While some insist that this doctrine did not mean the U.S. planned to fight a 
nuclear war, others highlight the war-fighting aspects of PD-59, such as the implication that the 
U.S. could control escalation during a nuclear war to achieve a favorable post-war balance.174 
Carter denied the apparent turn in his nuclear policy, claiming there was “no change in my goals, 
or my concept or my philosophy.”175  Regardless of the extent of the change, PD-59 required 
significant weapons buildups and even superiority in order for the U.S. to inflict devastating 
nuclear attacks with reserve forces after an initial nuclear exchange.  Why did Carter adopt such 
a policy? 
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 In this chapter, I first outline the evolution of the Carter administration’s nuclear strategy, 
beginning with the development of the countervailing strategy and culminating in its codification 
in PD-59.  Next, I test the theory of legitimation and coalition building; in contrast to the 
previous chapter, this debate took place largely in private and prevented the mobilization of 
coalitions to undermine the countervailing strategy.  Then I show that while perceptions of an 
increasing Soviet threat motivated some architects of the strategy, they cannot explain why this 
particular strategy came to dominate the administration’s nuclear policy.  The domestic political 
context placed some pressure on Carter to choose a strategy bolstering U.S. military strength, but 
the countervailing strategy’s success partially depended on legitimating it to this domestic 
audience.  I argue the countervailing strategy persisted because its advocates carefully controlled 
private debate to decrease the need to legitimate the strategy in contrast to other alternatives.  In 
private, they had the freedom to develop a strategy maintaining essential equivalence that 
focused on denying any Soviet advantages.  The countervailing strategy’s success also stemmed 
from its public legitimation; the administration used rhetoric demonstrating it adhered to MAD 
while preventing Soviet superiority to appeal to both parity narratives and block accusations of 
undermining deterrence.  The private debate narrowing, plus this successful public appeal to 
domestic audiences, prevented a coalition favoring MAD from mobilizing against the 
countervailing strategy; this forced Carter to shift his narrative about parity closer to that of his 
critics and reassert the role of nuclear weapons as an essential part of national security.   
 
Flexible, Enduring Equivalence: The Development of PD-59 
 When Carter entered office, he inherited Richard Nixon’s nuclear doctrine, which still 
affirmed MAD in its declaratory policy while beginning to explore limited nuclear options in its 





massive counterforce attacks, Nixon complained about its rigidity and worried the threat of such 
devastating attacks lacked credibility.  In January 1974, he signed National Security Decision 
Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242), asking the Department of Defense for guidance on possible 
alternatives for nuclear weapons employment policy.  A few months later, Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger signed the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP).  As the first 
substantive change to the SIOP in roughly a decade, the NUWEP retained the major counterforce 
attack options while also developing Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) and Regional Nuclear 
Options (RNOs).176  The LNOs and RNOs created plans for low-level nuclear exchanges, such as 
a response to Soviet nuclear use against U.S. allies.  The Nixon administration hoped these 
modifications to U.S. strategic posture could deter nuclear war at any level of escalation.   
Carter criticized Nixon’s policies during the Presidential campaign, asserting his faith in 
MAD and denouncing policies that he believed indicated the U.S.’s pursuit of a first-strike 
capability.  In a press briefing on defense issues, Carter claimed the U.S. and Soviet Union both 
realized the balance of terror remained a key basis of stability and denounced the idea of limited 
nuclear options: “Even if we could ensure the war would be ‘limited’ in nature, it would still face 
the possibility of ten million Americans being killed.”177  In addition to this skepticism about 
LNOs’ viability in an actual nuclear exchange, members of the NSC worried the NUWEP did 
not actually provide a diverse array of nuclear options.  Zbigniew Brzezinski described the LNOs 
as “massive in both direct and collateral damage,” and argued the Nixon administration never 
ascertained a clear purpose for LNOs or plans for their use.178 
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In light of these doubts about existing nuclear strategy, Carter signed Presidential Review 
Memorandum 10 (PRM-10) on February 18, 1977, calling for a re-examination of “overall U.S. 
national strategy and capabilities.”179  Lynn Davis, a former political science professor and now 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, 
led the subsequent study considering five possible conflict scenarios.  For each, the team offered 
seven Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS).  For the potential U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
conflict, the AIMS ranged from MAD to damage limitation requiring clear nuclear superiority.  
The JCS critiqued the ambitious, lengthy study, claiming it lacked a clear statement of national 
interest and a precise definition of enemy capabilities.180  The intelligence community and the 
ACDA articulated additional complaints; the intelligence community worried the limited scope 
of AIMS would produce the same limited range of alternative strategies as previous studies, and 
the ACDA decried the absence of arms control considerations in the study.181 
 After PRM-10’s floundering, the Presidential Review Committee, a committee of NSC, 
held a series of meetings in June and July 1977 to interpret the findings from PRM-10 and define 
clearer goals for strategy and force posture.  While the group agreed the U.S. should maintain 
strategic equivalence with the Soviet Union, they disagreed on whether the Soviets believed they 
could fight and win a nuclear war, and on issues such as the amount of HTK needed to deter the 
Soviet Union.182  On August 30, 1977, Carter signed Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18), his first 
attempt at guiding the nuclear force posture.  This document, however, still rendered the nuclear 
posture a blank canvas, providing varied ideas with no guidance on how to implement them.  
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PD-18 said essential equivalence required that “advantages in strategic force characteristics 
enjoyed by the Soviet Union must be offset by United States advantages in strategic forces,” 
while also citing many U.S. military advantages and seeing opportunities for cooperation on 
arms control to enhance stability.183  One observer called the document “a mishmash of 
everyone’s pet concepts,” and another saw PD-18 as evidence of “the struggle for Carter’s soul 
between the hawks and doves.”184   
 PD-18 called for an additional nuclear targeting study to examine and revise Nixon’s 
policy laid out in NSDM-242.  Brown selected Leon Sloss, former deputy director of the Bureau 
of Political and Military Affairs at the Department of State and an ACDA assistant director under 
Nixon and Ford, to direct the study.  The group worked under the still controversial assumption 
that the Soviet Union had a concept of victory in nuclear war, so the final results of the study 
emphasized denying Soviet victory in any nuclear war.185  The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review 
(NTPR), finished in November 1978, considered four potential nuclear strategy alternatives: 
1. Preserve the SIOP, maintaining deterrence through major counterforce attacks  
2.  Add limited nuclear options targeting Soviet leadership and urban-industrial assets 
3. Add limited nuclear options targeting conventional and nuclear forces, augmenting 
flexibility and endurance  
4. Return to MAD, a strictly retaliatory posture against urban-industrial targets 
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In order to prevent and “unfavorable post-war nuclear force balance,” the study called for 
increased emphasis on flexibility—developing a “look-shoot-look” capability to locate assets and 
quickly retarget U.S. forces—and endurance, or building forces which could survive an initial 
nuclear strike and continue the exchange over a long period of time.186  The NTPR conclusions 
favored the third option, and the NSC and Pentagon began to advocate for this strategy.  They 
tentatively called it the “countervailing strategy,” but internal debates continued concerning its 
implementation, specifically on issues like developing the HTK-capability of the MX.187  
 Before the NSC reached a complete consensus on the countervailing strategy, however, 
Brown described it in the Fiscal Year 1980 Defense Annual Report in January 1979.  For the first 
time, Brown publicly denounced MAD, calling it no longer “wholly credible” in light of the 
Soviet military buildups of the last fifteen years.  He defined the countervailing strategy as the 
capability to respond to any attack such that the enemy “could have no expectation of achieving 
any rational objective,” calling for a policy covering a large list of targets and adding weapons 
like the MX and Trident to maintain essential equivalence.188  Claims that Carter had approved 
this strategy as official policy leaked to the press and generated controversy, as critics worried 
the U.S. had shifted away from MAD.189  The administration moved quickly to quiet the 
backlash, denying that Carter had formally endorsed this policy. 
 The White House did not officially begin to review the countervailing strategy until April 
1979, when the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) on the NSC held three meetings to 
discuss the NTPR and overall strategy.  Only the minutes from the first meeting on April 4 are 
declassified; in this meeting, the SCC discussed nuclear targeting and how to create the most 
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effective deterrent.  Spurgeon Keeny, the deputy director and ACDA representative on the SCC, 
voiced concerns that the countervailing strategy signaled a major policy change, as it shifted a 
significant number of urban-industrial targets to military targets and therefore moved the U.S. 
toward damage limitation.  While some aspects of the strategy, like targeting Soviet conventional 
forces on the move, were indeed new additions to targeting policy, Brown denied any major 
changes.  Although Brown favored MAD early in his term, he now argued targeting Soviet 
military and leadership targets would best deter the Soviets, even as Vance and Brzezinski 
thought the Soviets most valued urban-industrial targets.190  As the NSC refined the 
countervailing strategy, they faced pushback from several groups.  The ACDA and State 
Department still favored strategies closer to MAD, while Strategic Air Command and the Navy 
remained loyal to their SIOP.  Brzezinski and William E. Odom, Military Advisor to the 
National Security Advisor, realized they would need to retain the SIOP while adding options for 
flexibility and endurance to gain Pentagon approval.191 
 Brown described the countervailing strategy again in the SALT II hearings, tying it 
closely to the notion of essential equivalence.  He defined essential equivalence as the ability to 
deny the Soviets any of their goals for a strategic strike and to wage a general war of any 
plausible scope and duration.192  The administration still had not released a formal document 
outlining the strategy; Brzezinski later claimed that once Carter approved the MX, he personally 
pressed the President to issue a directive outlining the new strategy even though Brown did not 
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believe this step was necessary.193  At the same time, however, Carter still expressed skepticism 
about these policies, accusing the NSC of amplifying the actual Soviet threat.194  Nevertheless, 
the NSC and the Office of the Secretary of Defense began drafting a directive in early 1980.  
This group included only the top officials in each department, without much input from other 
NSC members.  The group also never sent drafts of what would become PD-59 to Edward 
Muskie, the new Secretary of State—Muskie did not find out about PD-59 until it leaked to the 
press in August.195  At the time, Odom justified the decision to restrict interagency coordination 
because it was “so closely related to military contingency planning, an activity that remains a 
closely held prerogative…of the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff.”196  The NSC 
intended for the new targeting policy to be a strictly military issue, so they relegated interagency 
coordination to a lower priority level. 
 In March and April 1980, several people, including Odom and Brown, produced drafts of 
PD-59 and debated their points of contention.  Brown wanted to include clauses emphasizing the 
primacy of pre-planned urban-industrial attacks over flexible response, and he hesitated to add 
sentences calling for the increased reserve forces needed for endurance.  Odom insisted on the 
inclusion of this point, arguing Brown’s own countervailing strategy would require “a larger and 
coercive reserve.”197  As the group worked through their disagreements, the 1980 Presidential 
campaign intensified as Reagan argued Carter had permitted the dangerous degradation of U.S. 
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defense, promising his own nuclear policy taking a harder line against the Soviet Union.198  
Ultimately, the PD-59 group reached a compromise and briefed Carter on July 24, 1980.  The 
next day, Carter signed PD-59.  The final document reiterated the countervailing strategy:  
“To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have 
nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our 
interests, any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a 
victory or any plausible definition of victory.” 
 
PD-59’s guidance on nuclear weapons employment included pre-planned options from the SIOP, 
allowing the President to select attacks from a full range of military, industrial, and political 
control targets.  An initial nuclear response would target primarily military targets, including 
enemy strategic and theater nuclear forces, military command, control, communications, and 
intelligence capabilities, and industrial facilities supporting military production.  These options 
would also require growing the reserve force to have survivable forces able to respond after the 
initial nuclear exchange.  Finally, PD-59 called for flexibility, developing limited targeting plans 
on short notice during an exchange—especially for achieving objectives in a theater nuclear 
campaign.199   
 News of PD-59 soon leaked to the press, with journalists noting it placed less emphasis 
on retaliation against cities and greater emphasis on military targets. The notion of flexibility and 
its associated limited nuclear strikes generated some apprehension; one official admitted 
flexibility was “more an aspiration than a reality now,” and the Director of the Federation of 
American Scientists questioned the flexible targeting options: “Who would be there to turn off 
                                                
198 Hendrick Smith, “Reagan Advisers Hold Somber View of Soviet Intentions,” New York Times, May 25, 1980; 
Richard Burt, “CARTER SAID TO BACK A PLAN FOR LIMITING ANY NUCLEAR WAR,” New York Times, 
August 6, 1980; Stephen F. Cohen, “Hard-Line Fallacies,” New York Times, August 22, 1980. 
199 William E. Odom to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “M-B-B Luncheon Item: Targeting,” August 5, 1980, with 





the war if we nuked Soviet command centers?”200  Both the public and Congress expressed 
concern about Muskie’s exclusion from PD-59 planning, prompting the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations to call a hearing on the new nuclear war strategy.201  Brown and Muskie 
testified at the hearing on September 16, 1980, both denying that PD-59 represented a major shift 
in strategy.  Muskie claimed the countervailing strategy merely augmented the traditional MAD 
doctrine, and Brown called it “a natural evolution of the conceptual foundation built over a 
generation by men like Robert McNamara and James Schlesinger.”202  While some Senators 
maintained concerns about the new nuclear strategy, the hearing seemed to placate the rest; 
Albright wrote to Brzezinski after the hearing that she did not expect further discussion on the 
topic.203  The Pentagon began to draft more detailed military planning for PD-59 in the fall, but 
plans stalled once Reagan was elected President in November 1980. 
 
MAD in the Streets, Counterforce in the Sheets: Legitimation and PD-59 
 
 What role, if any, did coalition building and legitimation play in the formulation and 
persistence of the countervailing strategy in Carter’s nuclear doctrine?  Although the strategic 
concerns described in the next section motivated the initial review and revision of the nuclear 
posture, they cannot explain why the administration chose the countervailing strategy among a 
range of options and why it persisted until PD-59.  There were ample opportunities for debate 
and revision, but the strategy remained almost entirely consistent throughout the whole period.  I 
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argue that mechanisms of limiting the scope of the debate, such as excluding people and 
restricting it to the private sphere, helped advocates of the countervailing strategy dominate 
strategic planning.  In this private sphere, advocates decreased the need to legitimate their 
strategy with respect to norms of deterrence, creating space for the denial aspects of the 
countervailing strategy.  When the strategy emerged in public several times, however, those 
advocates scrambled to legitimate it, couching it in the language of MAD and parity to prevent 
critics from mobilizing against the administration.  Moreover, this public rhetoric appealed to 
multiple coalitions by respecting MAD logic while denying Soviet superiority, all in the name of 
preserving parity.  The private decision-making dynamics streamlined the nuclear planning 
process, but they allowed the countervailing strategy to persist without revision through the end 
of Carter’s term.  
 It was not immediately clear or inevitable that the countervailing strategy’s tough stance 
of denying Soviet victory would come to dominate Carter’s nuclear strategy.  PD-18’s mix of 
optimism about the potential for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, plus a hard line toward Soviet military 
developments, reflected the mix of hawks and doves in the White House involved with its 
creation.  The countervailing strategy indicated the eventual dominance of the hawks in this 
private sphere of decision-making, and the apparent abandonment of Carter’s optimism and faith 
in MAD and parity.  Several mechanisms of the private nuclear planning process narrowed the 
scope of debate and prevented the mobilization of groups favoring alternative strategies. 
 First, some actors became deliberately excluded from debates about nuclear strategy.  For 
instance, the actors who completed the NTPR all held the belief that the Soviet Union had a 





problems of fighting and surviving a nuclear war should it occur, and of winning.”204  The NTPR 
claimed the intelligence community had reached a consensus on this point, but later accounts 
express doubts about the prevalence and certainty of this assumption.  Nevertheless, the group’s 
belief narrowed the range of options considered—while the NTPR kept MAD as a major policy 
option, major recommendations like flexibility aimed to deny Soviet war objectives and strike 
military assets.  Further, even when the study considered MAD as an option of future strategy, it 
still insisted, “A continued capability to execute a wide range of limited attacks would be 
possible.”205  The rhetoric around the objectives of a nuclear strategy began to shift alongside 
this narrowing.  While earlier documents like PD-18 emphasized the importance of essential 
equivalence to prevent the Soviet Union from exerting political leverage, rhetoric in the NTPR 
and onward stressed essential equivalence to deny any Soviet victory.206  The recommendations 
from this group with shared perceptions of the Soviet Union soon took the shape of the 
countervailing strategy. 
Similar dynamics of exclusion also occurred later during the drafting of PD-59, 
decreasing the need to legitimate the countervailing strategy against opposing voices.  In addition 
to excluding the State Department, the process excluded all but the principals in the NSC and 
Pentagon, restricting the debate to a limited sphere.  Although the smaller group may have made 
decision-making more efficient, Marshall Schulman, a Columbia University professor, described 
PD-59 as “a case study in how not to make security policy.”207  While many naturally viewed 
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nuclear targeting as a strictly military matter, initial conversations about targeting in the SCC 
meetings did include representatives from the State Department and the ACDA.  As the process 
evolved, however, these groups became excluded from the debate.  Actors like Muskie might 
have voiced opposition to components of the countervailing strategy, but by excluding them, the 
makers of PD-59—those who favored doctrines emphasizing counterforce targeting and limited 
nuclear options—could dominate conversations about strategy and ultimately dominate policy.  
Removing actors from this debate meant people like Brzezinski and Odom did not have to justify 
the countervailing strategy to critics, which might have opened up space others to propose 
alternative strategies.  Without this debate and opposition, the administration constructed a 
consensus around the countervailing strategy.   
 Second, proponents of the countervailing strategy prevented opportunities for revision 
and precluded consideration of alternative strategies by taking issues off the table for debate. 
While much of the debate about the countervailing strategy still remains classified, the minutes 
from the first April 1979 SCC meeting provide insights about the nature of these strategy 
debates.  At the end of this meeting, Gen. David Jones, Chairman of the JCS, noted they had 
discussed neither flexibility nor endurance—two key features of the countervailing strategy that 
distanced it from MAD.  Brzezinski, however, foreclosed debate on these issues by saying he 
assumed they “were understood by all.”208 Brzezinski presumed consensus on these issues so no 
one could debate them; this pivoted future conversations to focus on the specifics of forces 
required for flexibility and endurance, rather than focus on whether these concepts should be 
included at all.  This meeting may not be representative of all strategic planning meetings, but 
the overall lack of nuclear strategy meetings suggests the countervailing strategy gained 
momentum and support by avoiding scrutiny.  This lack of review and revision streamlined the 
                                                





pipeline from countervailing strategy to PD-59 by preventing other actors from offering 
alternatives that could challenge the countervailing strategy’s dominance in nuclear planning.  
 All of these acts of narrowing the debate about the countervailing strategy restricted the 
audience for its legitimation, preventing alternative strategies from gaining support and 
challenging the countervailing strategy.  While strategic planning necessarily takes place in 
private, the countervailing strategy’s architects even excluded people and ideas from this sphere 
of private debate.  In theories of agenda setting, the “expansion of conflict,” or the broadening of 
debate to a wider group, allows for more intense contestation to weaken the dominant position.  
In this case, I argue that by restricting the scope of debate about nuclear strategy, Brzezinski and 
Brown limited potential challenges to the countervailing strategy.  They formulated the strategy 
from early NTPR recommendations and eliminated much of the work of legitimation by debating 
it in only a few, increasingly exclusive, meetings.  Advocates of the countervailing strategy did 
not need to legitimate it to compete with other groups, giving them the freedom to craft a 
strategy focused on denial without accusations of undermining deterrence.  Had the debate taken 
place in public, there would have been a wider audience to critique this policy.  People favoring 
alternative strategies like MAD could have used this audience to mobilize support and challenge 
the countervailing strategy.  
 While the countervailing strategy derived much of its strength from its limited visibility 
in the private sphere, it eventually entered the public sphere and the administration needed to 
legitimate it.  After Brown’s unsuccessful legitimation during the FY1980 Annual Report, the 
authors of PD-59 took care to use rhetoric demonstrating its consistency with norms of 
deterrence.  The backlash from Brown’s hearing centered on his quote that MAD was “no longer 





first strike in times of crisis—a step most Americans reject as immoral.”209  This criticism forced 
the administration to clarify that the statement was not yet official policy.  By explicitly 
dismissing MAD, Brown suggested the administration eschewed norms of deterrence and 
planned to fight a nuclear war.  The larger public audience included critics skeptical of the need 
to deny Soviet superiority; the administration needed to successfully legitimate the 
countervailing strategy to prevent their mobilization.  After this instance of failed legitimation, 
later iterations of the countervailing strategy avoided the rhetoric refuting MAD, and Brown 
balked at any language that might associate the strategy with warfighting.  In Brzezinski's March 
1980 draft of PD-59, Brown excised a section describing the targeting of U.S. flexible forces as a 
means to “fight a nuclear war, if need be,” labeling it “war fighting.”210  He insisted PD-59 
demonstrate that “our objective remains deterrence and that we have no illusions about either 
side being able to count on fighting and winning a nuclear war.”211  It is certainly true that U.S. 
nuclear war plans had always included military targeting, and Brzezinski and Odom believed 
MAD gave the U.S. a “1914 War Plan.”212  But the architects of the countervailing strategy 
understood they could not adopt a strategy with a purely counterforce declaratory policy.  They 
needed to demonstrate the countervailing strategy’s adherence to norms of deterrence to resonate 
with audiences and prevent critics from mobilizing against them. 
 The administration also moved to legitimate the countervailing strategy in public after 
Carter signed PD-59 and someone leaked it to the press.  At a time when Republicans were 
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increasingly deriding Carter’s nuclear policy, the leak may have been a strategic rhetorical 
maneuver by the administration.  They could bring PD-59 out in public and confront these 
criticisms directly, controlling the debate on their own terms by legitimating their actual strategy.  
The administration’s legitimation emphasized the strategy’s “evolutionary” nature, insisting it 
was not a departure from previous nuclear strategies.  While they wanted to present a muscular 
nuclear strategy, they still needed this evolutionary rhetoric to avoid accusations of creating a 
war-fighting strategy.  Some aspects of PD-59—like the pre-planned options—were consistent 
with earlier strategies, but other concepts like flexibility and endurance were new additions.  In 
fact, Brzezinski called PD-59 “the third major revision of the strategic doctrine since World War 
II,” but joined other officials in assuring the public that it was not a major change.213  Even if 
they did not believe in its evolutionary character, both Brown and Muskie used this rhetoric in 
the Nuclear War Strategy Hearings: Muskie called the countervailing strategy “not a radical 
departure from existing policy,” and Brown called it “a natural evolution” from older strategy.214  
If they had admitted PD-59 was a radical departure from the previous doctrine, they would have 
indicated the administration rejected existing conventions of MAD and planned to fight a nuclear 
war.  Brown’s rhetoric attempted to show the U.S. would not fight a nuclear war while also 
showing the U.S. would counter all Soviet war-fighting aims:  
“PD-59 does not assume that we can win a limited nuclear war, nor does it intend 
or pretend to enable us to do so.  It does seek both to prevent the Soviets from 
being able to win such a war and to convince them they could not win such a war.  
I do not believe either side could win a limited nuclear war; and I want to ensure 
as best we can that the Soviets do not believe so either.”215  
 
Although the administration needed to reassure the Soviet Union it did not plan to fight a nuclear 
war to avoid dangerous arms racing, their legitimation also suggests sensitivity to domestic 
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perceptions.  Critics, especially those in Congress, would reject any strategy not clearly rooted in 
historical notions of deterrence.  Even though the countervailing strategy gained support as a 
result of the private debate, its architects recognized its legitimation mattered in the public 
moments that would decide strategy’s fate.   
 Brzezinski, Brown, Odom, and others exerted strong control over the development of the 
countervailing strategy in the private sphere, where they could regulate the debate to block 
opposition.  When they unveiled it in public, the countervailing strategy’s actual content was 
deliberately vague, allowing a multivocal legitimation to win support from domestic elites like 
Congress—even if parts of the strategy seemed contradictory.216  While the strategy needed to 
comply with existing notions of MAD and deterrence, it also needed to assuage public fears of 
future Soviet superiority.  As Representative Jack Kemp (R, NY) observed, “The biggest scandal 
to ever hit this Nation would be if the American people ever wake up and find themselves in a 
position of military inferiority with the Soviet Union.”217  The countervailing strategy had to 
deny Soviet victory in a nuclear war and maintain a favorable post-war strategic balance, while 
also demonstrating the U.S. did not believe it could fight and win a nuclear war.  This 
legitimation blocked the mobilization of an opposing coalition: since the strategy claimed to 
deny Soviet victory, it delegitimized more restrained alternatives by suggesting anything less 
than the countervailing strategy would allow Soviet superiority.  Congress’s acceptance of PD-
59 after only one hearing demonstrates this legitimation’s effectiveness.  By including existing 
targeting plans and new flexible options to maintain essential equivalence, PD-59 appealed to 
pessimists about parity and affirmed the administration’s commitment to deterrence.  
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In sum, the privacy of the debate about nuclear strategy removed alternatives to the 
countervailing strategy, which in turn decreased the need for proponents to legitimate this 
strategy.  Proponents of the countervailing strategy like Brown and Brzezinski faced fewer 
rhetorical constraints and could advocate a strategy effectively requiring nuclear superiority, as 
they had prevented an opposing coalition from mobilizing against them.  This is not to say, 
however, that public legitimation did not also ensure the countervailing strategy’s survival.  Had 
the public declaratory policy not conformed to the language of MAD, it would have violated 
norms of deterrence and become vulnerable to attacks from an opposing coalition accusing the 
administration of proposing a nuclear war-fighting strategy.  By carefully legitimating the 
strategy as an evolution of existing doctrine, the administration placated skeptics who feared 
Carter would allow Soviet superiority and erode deterrence while also blocking opposition 
worried about abandoning MAD.  Ultimately, the countervailing strategy persisted because of 
this narrow private debate and effective public legitimation; it is not surprising that Carter signed 
a document on which his advisors had reached a perceived consensus, and which appealed to 
notions of deterrence and essential equivalence.   
 
The International Politics of the Countervailing Strategy 
 
Some might dispute the above argument, instead claiming international politics—
specifically, heightened perceptions of the Soviet threat—necessitated Carter’s adoption of PD-
59.  It is true that the nuclear targeting review began in response to general trends in Soviet 
doctrine; Soviet geopolitical moves, weapons buildups, and strategic modernization fed into 
perceptions that the Soviet Union planned to fight a nuclear war.  These developments, however, 
did not specifically dictate the countervailing strategy.  The administration lacked consensus 





considered several other strategy options, so this explanation cannot completely explain the 
countervailing strategy’s persistence in the Carter White House. 
The countervailing strategy developed based on a few administration officials’ 
assumptions about Soviet nuclear warfighting capabilities, which stemmed from general trends 
of increasing Soviet nuclear forces and the arrival of strategic parity.  As Schilling observed, 
U.S. policymakers’ anxiety about Soviet superiority and intentions revealed their tendency to 
assess the strategic balance by counting missiles rather than relating capabilities to different war 
outcomes.218  In 1978, the Soviet Union increased its numbers of SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 
missiles—all with MIRVed capability—and deployed four additional Delta 3 submarines 
carrying up to 16 MIRVed missiles each.219  U.S. intelligence reports noted that although the 
Soviets were continuing their modernization on the expected trajectory, their ICBMs had higher 
accuracy than expected.220  As seen in Chapter 3, these capabilities generated fears that the 
Soviet Union planned to fight a nuclear war.  The increased HTK-capability and accuracy of 
Soviet missiles gave them incentives to take advantage of these capabilities by striking first, and 
their increased theater nuclear capability suggested plans for lower-level nuclear exchanges.  The 
authors of the NTPR argued these developments eroded U.S. counterforce capability, and Brown 
cited the Soviet Union’s “impressive military strides” as evidence the Soviets planned to fight a 
nuclear war.221  The state of parity compounded these fears, as the same policymakers worried 
impending Soviet numerical superiority would give the Soviet Union additional political 
leverage.  They drew links between trends in Soviet military capabilities and the assumption that 
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the Soviets planned to fight and win a nuclear war, prompting the idea of a strategy to deny 
Soviet victory.   
In this international politics explanation, the turn to the countervailing strategy would 
also stem from concerns about U.S. extended deterrence in an age of parity.  While the Carter 
administration expressed concerns about Soviet actions toward NATO in its move to review 
nuclear targeting policy, they did not unanimously agree the countervailing strategy would best 
bolster extended deterrence.  There were some concerns about Soviet military buildups in 
intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe during this period.  In 
particular, 1978 saw increases in Soviet deployments of the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 
missile—both theater nuclear forces—while the U.S. did not possess any medium-range ballistic 
missile capability.  This development may have increased Allies’ fears about extended 
deterrence, which could have prompted increased U.S. interest in LNOs to defend them against 
lower levels of Soviet aggression.  In fact, discussions of NATO in U.S. nuclear policy 
documents center on Allied concerns about U.S. ability to deter aggression towards them.222  It is 
not clear, however, that the countervailing strategy best served this purpose.  Rather than 
decrying Soviet aggression, NATO reaffirmed its decision to make détente its official policy 
during this period.223  Further, the administration debated whether the Allies even wanted the 
countervailing strategy.  The State Department released a report in August 1980 doubting PD-
59’s utility for extended deterrence, saying, “PD-59’s attention to increased targeting flexibility 
and the capacity to launch limited attacks over an extended period will be in tension with 
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[NATO’s] deeply held aversion to nuclear warfighting.”224  The administration could have 
developed an alternative nuclear strategy focused on extended deterrence without enhanced 
flexibility and endurance, but they chose the countervailing strategy despite Allies’ concerns. 
The bulk of U.S. nuclear strategic planning occurred from late 1978 to spring 1980; if 
this explanation of the countervailing strategy is correct, this period should have seen specific 
events indicating increasing Soviet geopolitical influence beyond these concerns about extended 
deterrence.  Much of the last chapter overlaps with this period, and as stated earlier, the Soviet 
Union’s growing influence in countries like Yemen, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua increased 
tensions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.  While the U.S. denounced these actions, they did not 
seem to create a major increase in Soviet geopolitical influence that had direct implications for 
U.S. nuclear planning.   
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was arguably the most significant 
act of Soviet aggression during Carter’s term, but it did not cause Carter to pivot towards the 
countervailing strategy.  The invasion alarmed the U.S. for a number of reasons: the Soviet 
Union expanding its sphere of influence by establishing another socialist government on its 
border, the increased presence of Soviet troops and weapons in the Persian Gulf, and the 
potential for the Soviet Union to gain control of Middle East oil.225  Some authors argue this 
moment triggered Carter’s harder line toward the Soviet Union and the adoption of PD-59.  
Afghanistan did cause some change in Carter’s attitude; he admitted his “opinion of [Russia] has 
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changed more drastically in the last week than the previous two and a half years.”226  In January 
1980, he unveiled the “Carter Doctrine,” aiming to protect the Persian Gulf from further Soviet 
influence and calling the Soviet Union “the most serious threat to peace since the Second World 
War.”227  By December 1979, however, most of the decision-making about nuclear strategy had 
already occurred—at best, the invasion of Afghanistan might have sped up the process of 
drafting PD-59.  Even during the countervailing strategy revision process, Carter still had not 
become totally convinced of Soviet plans to fight a nuclear war.  Brzezinski recounted meetings 
as late as summer 1979 where Carter grew frustrated with NSC members who he perceived to be 
inflating the Soviet threat.228  Overall, Afghanistan played a minor role in Carter’s turn to the 
countervailing strategy, and Soviet geopolitical moves did not appear to significantly influence 
U.S. nuclear planning.   
 An account of the countervailing strategy as a reaction to Soviet actions on the 
international stage cannot explain why the Carter administration selected this particular strategy, 
and why it remained unchanged for two years.  First, the administration did not all agree that the 
countervailing strategy would best counter Soviet nuclear strategy.  In the April 4 SCC meeting, 
Brown expressed doubts that nuclear war could be fought over a long time even if the U.S. 
adopted the countervailing strategy, predicting any nuclear war would soon become all-out war.  
In the same meeting, David Aaron, Deputy National Security Advisor, worried that trying to gain 
an edge over the Soviets would only encourage the Soviets to improve or expand their forces.229  
As seen in the NTPR, the administration contemplated several different targeting options in 
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response to an increasing Soviet threat—the countervailing strategy was not an inevitable or 
unanimous choice.  Even major proponents of the countervailing strategy, like Odom, considered 
other options.  Odom always expressed frustration with the credibility of the massive SIOP 
attack options, but he began to favor flexibility only after innovation in U.S. information-
gathering abilities.  The shift to electro-optical satellite imaging allowed the development of 
“look-see-look” capabilities, where the U.S. could locate targets and transmit the information to 
SAC within a few hours, allowing them to retarget ICBMs to those locations.  U.S. technological 
developments helped imagine a strategy beyond “a huge mechanical war plan aimed at creating 
maximum damage without regard to the political context.”230  Odom’s choice of the 
countervailing strategy came from improvements to U.S. capabilities rather than solely from his 
perceptions of the Soviet threat.  
 Second, if concerns about increased Soviet capabilities played a primary causal role in 
PD-59’s development, the strategic planning should have devoted significant attention to 
matching Soviet capabilities.  While policymakers tried to match Soviet capabilities with the 
MX, the architects of the countervailing strategy repeatedly downplayed the importance of U.S. 
capabilities in the operational aspects of this strategy.  When the JCS argued the U.S. did not 
have adequate capability to execute the countervailing strategy, Brzezinski said, “While 
declaring this strategy before we have the capability to carry it out may seem unrealistic, the 
strategy is essential to maintaining Alliance cohesion.”231  Brown remained reticent about 
bolstering U.S. capabilities to uphold his own strategy’s principles; he did not want to increase 
reserve forces, but Odom observed, “[Brown’s] own concept of a countervailing strategy seems 
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to require a larger and coercive reserve.”232 Brown might have been willing to approve these 
capabilities if he had been purely concerned about the rising Soviet threat, but both Brzezinski 
and Brown placed greater stock in the inherent value of the declaratory policy.  Ultimately, the 
administration considered myriad strategies to counter the perceived Soviet military doctrine and 
they did not all consider the countervailing strategy the best option.  Soviet strategy and 
capabilities cannot fully account for the selection of the countervailing strategy; only through the 
internal process of narrowing the strategic debate could the countervailing strategy come to 
dominate the alternatives. 
 
Domestic Politics and PD-59 
 Some might also argue the countervailing strategy stemmed from Carter’s response to 
domestic political attitudes; he capitulated to pressure from interest groups, domestic elites, and 
the rest of the public to take a harder line against the Soviet Union.  Despite these domestic 
attitudes, Carter did not select the countervailing strategy in response to specific constituent 
demands.  The strategy persisted because it was largely shielded from this public audience; when 
the administration revealed it in public, they won support from this audience in their legitimation 
of the countervailing strategy as a means to maintain essential equivalence.  
 The domestic political context necessitated the countervailing strategy’s legitimation as a 
means to deny Soviet superiority, but public opinion did not directly influence this policy 
formulation.  The year the administration began reviewing its nuclear posture, 1978, marked the 
first time since 1957 that more Americans perceived the Soviet Union ahead of the U.S. 
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militarily than perceived the U.S. ahead of the Soviet Union.233  This public skepticism about 
U.S. military capability persisted; by August 1979, one-third of Americans believed the U.S. 
held a military advantage, one third believed the Soviet Union held a military advantage, and one 
third believed the countries were evenly matched.234  Other 1979 polls reported that a majority of 
Americans believed the U.S. military capability was “weaker than it ought to be,” and that 73 
percent perceived U.S. military capability as equal to or weaker than that of the Soviet Union.  
These polls reflect a general trend of public desire to spend more on defense—this figure jumped 
from 30 percent of Americans to 60 percent of Americans from 1978 to 1979.235  While the 
public opinion did not articulate a particular optimal nuclear strategy, it did increase the need to 
demonstrate the U.S. would remain strong on defense in an age of parity.  Carter often reiterated 
this point in his speeches, especially those related to the nuclear balance.236  The countervailing 
strategy’s public legitimation, emphasizing essential equivalence and deterrence, spoke directly 
to these domestic anxieties and insisted the U.S. would prevent Soviet superiority even after a 
nuclear war.  This legitimation demonstrates an attempt to influence public opinion, but it is less 
clear that this public opinion influenced the initial strategic planning.   
Some contemporary observers also hypothesized that PD-59 served as a response to 
Republican attacks on Carter’s defense and foreign policies, as Carter signed it just before the 
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Democratic National Convention in 1980.237  Certainly, during the 1980 Presidential campaign, 
Reagan often cited Carter’s foreign policy failures as evidence of Carter’s weakness against the 
Soviet Union.  He derided Carter’s inadequate defense spending and proposed a nuclear strategy 
similar to the countervailing strategy, meant to deny any potential Soviet victory in a nuclear 
war.238  The Carter administration recognized PD-59’s utility in countering these accusations; 
Odom noted in a July 1980 memo to Brzezinski, “The Republican platform includes a lot of 
nuclear war-fighting doctrine.  The issue may or may not come up in the campaign, but…the PD 
is needed to clarify our policy and leave no room for confusion.”239  PD-59 could showcase 
Carter’s commitment to a strong defense and to preventing Soviet superiority, refuting some of 
the Republican obloquies against him.  While this pressure likely influenced the timing of PD-
59’s signing and leaking to the press, the administration had been developing the countervailing 
strategy long before the campaign.  This Republican pressure alone was insufficient to bring 
about Carter’s embrace of the countervailing strategy.  
Unlike the SALT and MX debate, domestic elites and interest groups played a smaller 
role in debates about nuclear strategy during mid-1978 to 1980 by virtue of their privacy.  Based 
on the Congressional attitudes discussed in Chapter 3, many members of Congress would have 
supported a strategy that required an increase in nuclear forces—as long as the doctrine did not 
suggest the U.S. would fight a nuclear war.  While PD-59 faced some skepticism and scrutiny in 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, the Committee seemed satisfied after only 
one session.  Similarly, hawkish interest groups like the CPD pressed for nuclear modernization 
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and even superiority throughout Carter’s term, but they focused their energy on pressing for the 
MX and railing against SALT II.240  The CPD did not explicitly argue for specific nuclear 
strategies.  These groups contributed to the growing public support for a harder line against the 
Soviet Union, but there does not appear to be a direct causal link between any particular 
demands and Carter’s nuclear strategy.  Because the administration kept the review and revision 
of nuclear strategy so private, these groups barely knew it was happening; this privacy likely 
insulated the strategy from specific instances of domestic pressure or mobilization that could 
have influenced Carter to pursue a certain strategy. 
These domestic pressures may not have had a primary role in the development and 
survival of the countervailing strategy, but the Carter administration still tried to influence these 
domestic opinions when the time came to legitimate the countervailing strategy.  PD-59 may not 
represent a response to demands from specific domestic constituencies, but it shows some 
awareness of domestic attitudes toward deterrence and the Soviet threat.  The administration 
anticipated and responded to domestic concerns when presenting the strategy to the public—they 
formulated the declaratory policy with an eye toward both international and domestic perceptions 




The architects of the countervailing strategy initially chose this targeting policy based on 
assumptions that the Soviet Union believed it could win a nuclear war.  By supplementing the 
SIOP with additional counterforce targeting options, they hoped to demonstrate to both the 
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Soviets and the U.S. population that the Soviet Union could have no chance of victory.  
Although this strategy contradicted Carter’s initial goals, the private policymaking process 
decreased the need for legitimation of the countervailing strategy, preventing the consideration 
of alternatives and preventing coalitional mobilization against it.  In the absence of public 
rhetorical battles, the countervailing strategy remained unscathed as its advocates constructed a 
consensus around it by narrowing private debates.  In public, however, the administration needed 
to sell this strategy to its domestic audience, so its legitimation used deliberately vague and 
contradictory rhetoric to appeal to multiple coalitions.  PD-59 utilized the language of MAD to 
demonstrate its consistency with norms of deterrence, while also emphasizing the development 
of flexibility and endurance to prevent Soviet superiority.  Without this legitimation, critics could 
have delegitimized the countervailing strategy by accusing the administration of pursuing a 
warfighting strategy.  This combination of private debate and the demands of public legitimation 
led Carter to sign PD-59 as a means to maintain deterrence in an age of parity and use nuclear 
weapons to enhance national security, even as this strategy pushed the U.S. toward nuclear 
superiority and embraced an altogether different narrative about the role of nuclear weapons 









 This study characterized Carter’s nuclear policy as a site of domestic contestation within 
broader debates about the meaning of strategic parity; Carter’s policy shifted partially because 
coalitions mobilized against Carter’s initial vision as they successfully legitimated alternative 
policies.  Critics argued Carter’s plans for arms control and a MAD nuclear strategy violated 
norms of deterrence, so the administration needed to shift its policy to avoid further public 
backlash and win support from domestic elites.  Parity’s unsettled nature allowed multiple 
interpretations of this moment to compete in nuclear policy debates.  Beginning with the Warnke 
controversy and continuing in the SALT II debate, those worried about parity delegitimized 
Carter’s policy of restraint by arguing it would permit Soviet superiority and undermine 
deterrence.  They masked calls for U.S. superiority in calls for maintaining parity to prevent the 
loss of U.S. political leverage; the public nature of this debate provided the audience allowing 
this coalition to mobilize.  Carter shifted his rhetoric closer to that of his critics, but only lent 
legitimacy to their claims framing Carter’s policies as inadequate for deterrence and empowered 
critics to call for additional nuclear programs.  By failing to control the public debate, Carter 
enabled this coalition to push nuclear policy away from his optimistic narrative about parity and 
away from his desire for nuclear weapons’ reduced role in foreign policy.   
In private strategic planning, supporters of the countervailing strategy narrowed the scope 
of strategic debate by restricting the consideration of alternative strategies, preventing coalitions 
favoring other strategies like MAD from mobilizing against them.  With fewer constraints on 
legitimation, they constructed a consensus around this strategy designed to deny Soviet victory.  
Carter moved this strategy to the public sphere in the wake of additional pressure from 





MAD with measures denying Soviet victory in nuclear war, blocking mobilization against it 
from all sides.  By legitimating this strategy to prevent Soviet superiority, however, Carter’s 
policy further embraced the pessimistic narrative of parity.  In all these cases, the international 
environment provided some impetus to meet the Soviet threat, but these perceptions did not 
dictate Carter’s specific nuclear policy choices.  Carter could not sell his narrative of parity and 
nuclear weapons; his policies are the result of his failure to prevent the mobilization of a hawkish 
coalition who saw nuclear weapons as essential to national security, as he needed to combat their 
legitimation to demonstrate his nuclear policy would not violate existing norms of deterrence.   
 
Implications for Other Cases 
 This work focused on a single case, but can the theory here help explain other Presidents’ 
policies?  The trajectory of Obama’s nuclear policy most closely mirrors Carter’s story, as 
Obama approved major arms control in New START while approving a massive nuclear 
modernization program.  A preliminary analysis of Obama’s case suggests some similar 
dynamics of legitimation.  When Obama needed to gain Senate approval of New START, he met 
a small group of fierce opponents led by Jon Kyl (R, AZ), who feared the treaty would weaken 
the U.S. strategic position and erode U.S. extended deterrence.  While the opposition in this case 
split more clearly along partisan lines, the Obama administration still scrambled to legitimate 
New START to its critics.  To reinforce his claims that New START would not weaken the 
U.S.’s deterrent, Obama made concessions to Kyl in the form of investment in nuclear 
laboratories and other nuclear infrastructure.241  This investment helped launch the major 
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modernization program, which gained further momentum after Russia invaded Ukraine and 
significantly soured U.S.-Russia relations.  The modernization program, totaling about $350 
billion over the next decade, included the B61-12 warhead with “dial-a-yield” capability, a 
replacement for the Ohio-class submarine, the long-range strike bomber to replace the B-52 and 
B-1, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent to replace Minuteman III ICBMs, and the Long 
Range Stand Off Weapon to replace the air-launched cruise missile.242  Pressure from the 
Pentagon likely also influenced the decision to proceed with all of these projects; Sam Nunn, 
now a major arms control advocate, lamented, “The process has preserved the status quo,” 
meaning bureaucratic momentum prevented Obama from halting a modernization program 
already set in motion.243 
 At the same time, however, Obama still had the agency to sell New START to skeptics, 
and he chose the rhetoric of improving nuclear weapons in order to make future cuts while still 
maintaining a strong deterrent.  Cooperation on future arms control, however, became impossible 
as distrust grew between Obama and Vladimir Putin.  Additionally, public legitimation of the 
modernization programs seemed to respect similar norms of deterrence, as it avoided describing 
a war-fighting capability while promising a U.S. advantage.  Although critics derided the B61 as 
a “war-fighting weapon,” the administration insisted it would create “more strategic stability” 
while also preventing others like Russia or China from gaining superiority.  Even programs that 
seemed like entirely new weapons were evolutionary and did not provide any new military 
capabilities, again inserting these weapons programs into the language of MAD.244  While it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to provide more than speculation about the processes by which 
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Obama came to accept these nuclear programs, this suggests that Obama considered both 
international and domestic politics when formulating his strategy, as he needed to appease 
coalitions of domestic elites like Congressmen who could unseat his vision.  Obama initially 
tried to tell a story of nuclear weapons being used solely for deterrence, while his critics saw 
them as an essential part of national security writ large.  If Obama had proceeded with arms 
control without the modernization, these critics would have argued the U.S. was giving up its 
strategic superiority and therefore the leverage afforded by nuclear weapons, thus undermining 
deterrence.  At the very least, the debate here demonstrates a similar repertoire of rhetoric used to 
legitimate U.S. nuclear policy; the domestic requirements of legitimation that respects deterrence 
while preserving U.S. dominance may constrain Presidents’ ability to sell their desired programs 
at home.  
 
Implications for Theory 
 Carter’s case demonstrated some of the dynamics of coalition building and legitimation 
described in Chapter 1, as hawks built opposition against Carter by justifying alternative nuclear 
strategies.  The application of agenda setting theory to foreign policy merits future inquiry, as it 
is relevant in this case; when an issue gains increased public visibility, it allows for more 
widespread debate and a greater chance for those opposing the President to build a coalition.  In 
public debate, groups use resonant rhetoric to undermine their opponents—this case witnessed 
groups using or citing opposition language to point out weaknesses and strengthen their own 
case.  It is unclear, however, if successful legitimation and coalition building matter in all public 
nuclear policy debates, and future work might broaden this study to examine how and when 
debates about defense and foreign policy might influence policy outcomes.  These dynamics of 





need for legitimation and narrowed the scope of conflict, making it harder for opposing views to 
undermine the dominant one.  Some might object to this interpretation of private debate, arguing 
these policy outcomes stem more from trade-offs among different bureaucracies.  I was unable to 
adequately test a bureaucratic politics theory of nuclear decision-making, but future work might 
evaluate the extent to which bureaucratic interests motivated those involved in policy planning 
and how the President might have balanced these trade-offs alongside the demands of 
legitimation.  Additionally, agenda setting literature often highlights the role of the media in 
elevating certain issues to public attention, but I did not interrogate the media’s culpability in 
shaping domestic perceptions of Carter’s nuclear policy choices.  Throughout Carter’s term, 
however, the media—specifically newspapers—amplified those voices most critical of Carter, so 
this coverage may have helped build the coalition against Carter.  Thus, future analysis might 
conceptualize the media as having an active role in shaping the national security narrative in 
addition to merely capturing this narrative.   
 This work used Krebs’s theory of narratives and settled or unsettled moments as a 
stepping-stone to study the dynamics of nuclear policy debate, and it suggests some future 
directions for Krebs’ line of inquiry.  While it is difficult to distinguish settled and unsettled 
moments in the national narrative, it appears that the existence of an unsettled moment mattered 
in this case, as it afforded legitimacy to multiple interpretations of parity and permitted the rise 
of the hawkish coalition arguing for increased nuclear capabilities.  They strengthened their 
narrative’s legitimacy by showing Carter’s narrative would permit U.S. inferiority, making it 
harder for Carter to guide the country toward one dominant narrative about parity.  Future work 
could conduct more rigorous text analysis to establish parity as an unsettled moment and 





This may include tracing rhetoric throughout other Presidential administrations, likely beginning 
with Nixon and continuing through Reagan.  Future work could also examine the processes by 
which domestic actors may challenge Presidential nuclear policy in settled periods, and whether 
similar legitimation patterns occur in other unsettled periods.  This study suggests additional 
actors can help determine the national security narrative in the U.S.; the President has the bully 
pulpit, but the audience for his rhetoric has the agency to challenge him—other mechanisms 
beyond Presidential rhetoric can build or destroy security narratives.  
 Carter’s opponents often accused the administration of permitting U.S. strategic 
inferiority and undermining deterrence, forcing the administration to shift its rhetoric and policy 
to demonstrate its commitment to a strong defense.  At the same time, although hardliners 
claimed U.S. superiority would afford some political or military leverage, they almost never 
precisely defined this leverage.  This murkiness, however, did not seem to shake or weaken 
hardliner arguments, which stayed consistent throughout Carter’s term.  The idea that superiority 
ensures national security, even in the nuclear age, pervades U.S. strategic thinking.  One 
document called this the U.S.’s “Number One Syndrome”—as a consequence of U.S. 
superpower status, leaders might have trouble arguing for superiority’s irrelevance without 
facing charges of permitting U.S. decline.245  Further, the preoccupation with superiority 
encourages policies like PD-59 that prioritize matching capabilities one for one without 
necessarily focusing on the political objectives or post-war consequences of such capabilities.246  
This constrains the range of policies that can be legitimated to the public, allowing policies 
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pushing for nuclear superiority to masquerade as deterrence.  Additionally, it is difficult to 
legitimate a pure MAD strategy because it rejects the idea of nuclear weapons affording some 
political leverage beyond deterrence.  Opponents fear plans to reduce the arsenal and reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy will undercut U.S. nuclear superiority, but they frame 
their objections as concerns about undercutting deterrence.  Policymakers might need to couple 
MAD strategies with strategic modernization programs to avoid accusations of weakness.  
Additionally, these framings have clearly resonated with audiences despite their incoherence.  
Future work must explore not only when effective legitimation matters in nuclear policy, but 
why this legitimation succeeds—what other factors lend credibility to these framings to make 
them resonate and allow for mobilization?  
 Finally, this thesis began by questioning a growing body of literature that assumes U.S. 
policymakers have always tried to escape MAD due to their fears about Soviet objectives in a 
nuclear war.  It is true that some policymakers turned away from MAD because they chose to 
couple nuclear weapons to broader national security goals beyond deterrence, but not all 
policymakers shared this view.  Further, perceptions of the Soviet Union did not immediately 
dictate Carter’s turn away from MAD-type policies.  Only through a process of coalition 
building could the MAD skeptics turn U.S. employment and acquisition policy toward damage 
limitation and nuclear superiority.  While these groups could argue for policies designed to deny 
Soviet superiority, they could not recommend the U.S. pursue superiority.  Any language of U.S. 
superiority, first-strike capability, or warfighting generated public backlash for violating MAD 
and flouting existing norms of deterrence.  While some levels of nuclear policy seemed like 
evidence of an attempt to escape MAD, policymakers were still constrained by MAD in their 





of MAD in declaratory policy, and at times the policy only existed in this declaratory realm 
without the required capabilities to reinforce it.247  The evolution of U.S. nuclear policy was not 
an inexorable march away from MAD; the coalition trying to escape MAD came to dominate 
strategic planning through a process of contestation, and even then their policy still needed to fall 
within the bounds of MAD to maintain legitimacy.  
 This study has begun to draw attention to the need for scholars to devote more attention 
to the rhetoric and domestic politics fueling the formation of nuclear strategy.  While the 
international environment might create incentives to modify nuclear strategy, the strategy 
outcomes are closely tied to domestic politics as the precise choice of strategy may stem more 
from the competition between internal coalitions.  Moreover, talk matters, even in the often-
secret realm of nuclear policy; since effective deterrence ensures the U.S. never has to actually 
use its weapons and strategies, scholars should pay attention to public debate and declaratory 
policy as important to the formulation of nuclear strategy.  These policies may not just come 
from a desire to match or surpass enemy capabilities, but rather from the political necessity of 
crafting policy maintaining both deterrence and dominance in the national security realm.  To 
better understand the frequent contradictions between nuclear modernization, strategy, and arms 
control, future scholars should investigate how leaders balance the demands from a variety of 
coalitions to show their commitment to deterrence and craft a narrative about foreign policy.  
 
  
                                                
247 See Chapter 4 and the discussion of how the countervailing strategy existed primarily on a declaratory level, and 







Auten, Brian. Carter’s Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy.  Columbia: University of Missouri, 2009. 
Ball, Desmond. “The Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983.” In Strategic Nuclear Targeting, edited by Desmond Ball and 
Jeffrey Richelson, 57-83. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. 
Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” 
Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–39. 
Birkland, Thomas A. After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events. Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 1997. 
Brodie, Bernard. “War in the Atomic Age.” In The Absolute Weapon, edited by Bernard Brodie, 18-61. New York: 
Harcourt Brace and Co., 1946. 
Brown, Harold. “A Countervailing View.” Foreign Policy (2012). 
Brown, Harold. Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1980. Washington: Department of Defense, 1979. 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA082834. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981. New York: Farrar 
Straus & Giroux, 1983. 
Burr, William. “How to Fight a Nuclear War.” Foreign Policy (2012).  
Burr, William. “The Nixon Administration, the ‘Horror Strategy,’ and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-
1972.” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 3 (2005): 34–78. 
Burt, Richard. “The Scope and Limits of SALT.” Foreign Affairs 56, no. 4 (1978): 751–70.  
Cahn, Anne Hessing. “Team B: The Trillion-Dollar Experiment.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 49, no. 3 (1993): 22, 24-27.  
Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 
Cobb, Roger W. Cultural Strategies of Agenda Denial: Avoidance, Attack, and Redefinition (Studies in Government & 
Public Policy). Lawrence: University Press Of Kansas, 1997. 
Cohn, Carol. “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Signs 12, no. 4 (1987): 687–718. 
Collins, John M. U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 
1980. 
Dearing, James W., and Everett M. Rogers. Agenda-Setting. Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications, Inc, 1996. 
Elster, Jon. “Deliberation and Constitution Making.” In Deliberative Democracy, edited by Jon Elster, 97-122.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Finnemore, Martha. “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s 
Cracked Up to Be.” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 58–85. 
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. 
Gavin, Francis J. Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. 
Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2012. 
George, Alexander L. “Domestic Constraints and Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy 
Legitimacy.” In Change in the International System, edited by O. R. Holsti, R. Siverson, & A. L. George, 233-
262. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980. 
Gerber, Larry G. “The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War.” Diplomatic History 6, no. 1 (1982): 69–95. 
Glaser, Charles L. Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
Glaser, Daryl. “Does Hypocrisy Matter? The Case of US Foreign Policy.” Review of International Studies 32, no. 2 
(2006): 251–68. 
Goddard, Stacie E. “The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler’s Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39.” Security 
Studies 24, no. 1 (2015): 95–130.  
Goddard, Stacie E. When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2018. 
Gray, Colin S., and Keith Payne. “Victory Is Possible.” Foreign Policy, no. 39 (1980): 14–27.  
Green, Brendan Rittenhouse, and Austin Long. “The Geopolitical Origins of U.S. Hard-Target-Kill Counterforce 
Capabilities and MIRVs.” In The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs, edited by Michael Krepon et. al., 19-54. Washington: 
Stimson Center, 2016. 
Green, Brendan R., and Austin Long. “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear 





Greenhill, Kelly M. Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. 1st ed. Cornell 
University Press, 2010.  
Haider-Markel, Donald P., and Kenneth J. Meier. “The Politics of Gay and Lesbian Rights: Expanding the Scope of the 
Conflict.” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 2 (1996): 332–49.  
Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. 1st ed. New York: Knopf, 1985. 
Holland, Lauren H. and Robert A. Hoover. The MX Decision: A New Direction In U.S. Weapons Procurement Policy? 
Boulder, Colo: Routledge, 1985. 
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West. University of 
Michigan Press, 2006. 
Jervis, Robert. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. 1st edition. Cornell University Press, 1984. 
Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990. 
Kaplan, Fred, and Martin J. Sherwin. The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1991. 
Keefer, Edward C. Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Challenge 1977-1981. Washington, D.C.: Historical 
Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017. 
Keeny, Spurgeon M., and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky. “Mad versus Nuts: Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy the Mutual 
Hostage Relationship of the Superpowers?” Foreign Affairs 60, no. 2 (1981): 287–304.  
Kniss, Fred. “Ideas and Symbols as Resources in Intrareligious Conflict: The Case of American Mennonites.” Sociology of 
Religion; Washington 57, no. 1 (1996): 7-23. 
Krebs, Ronald R. Narrative and the Making of US National Security. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Krebs, Ronald R., and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political 
Rhetoric.” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 35–66.  
 Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl Grayson Press. “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy.” International 
Security 30, no. 4 (May 8, 2006): 7–44. 
Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press. “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear 
Deterrence.” International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 9–49. 
Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press. “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy.” Foreign Affairs, March 1, 2006. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2006-03-01/rise-us-nuclear-primacy. 
MacKenzie, Donald A. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance London: MIT Press, 
1990. 
Mattern, Janice Bially. Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force. New York: 
Routledge, 2005. 
McCarthy, John F. “The Case for the B-1 Bomber.” International Security 1, no. 2 (1976): 78–97.  
Mini, John D. “Forced Conversion: Civil-Military Relations and National Security Policy in the Carter Administration, 
1977-1981.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill, 2010. 
Nitze, Paul H. “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente.” Foreign Affairs 54, no. 2 (1976): 207–32.  
Odom, William E. “The Origins and Design of PD-59: A Memoir.” In Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured 
Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, edited by Henry D. Sokolski, 175-196. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute Publishing Office, 2004. 
Padgett, John F., and Christopher K. Ansell. “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434.” American Journal of 
Sociology 98, no. 6 (1993): 1259–1319. 
Payne, Rodger A. “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction.” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 
(2001): 37–61 
Perelman, Chaïm, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Notre Dame, Ind: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2008. 
Pipes, Richard. “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War.” Quadrant 21, no. 9 (September 
1977): 10. 
Riker, William H. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
Riker, William H. The Theory of Political Coalitions. Revised ed. edition. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1984. 
Rosenberg, David Alan. “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960.” International 
Security 7, no. 4 (1983): 3–71.  
Rovner, Joshua. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Cornell University Press, 2011. 
Sagan, Scott D. “SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy.” International Security 12, no. 1 (1987): 
22–51.  
Sanders, Jerry W. Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment. Boston, 





Schilling, Warner R. “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent 
Countervailing Parity.” International Security 6, no. 2 (1981): 48–79. 
Scoville, Herbert, Jr. MX: Prescription For Disaster.  Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1981. 
Skidmore, David. Reversing Course: Carter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform. Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1996. 
Snyder, Jack. “Dueling Security Stories: Wilson and Lodge Talk Strategy.” Security Studies 24, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 
171–97.  
Snyder, Jack, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon. “Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home.” World Politics 
61, no. 1 (January 2009): 155–87.  
Spinardi, Graham. From Polaris to Trident. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Stein, Arthur A. “The Justifying State: Why Anarchy Doesn’t Mean No Excuses.” In Peace, Prosperity, and Politics, 
edited by John Mueller, 235–55. Boulder: Westview, 2000. 
Stone, Deborah. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2012. 
Swidler, Ann. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (1986): 273–86.  
Thornton, Richard C. The Carter Years: Toward a New Global Order.  New York: Paragon House, 1992. 
Tjalve, Vibeke Schou, and Michael C. Williams. “Reviving the Rhetoric of Realism: Politics and Responsibility in Grand 
Strategy.” Security Studies 24, no. 1 (2015): 37–60. 
Trachtenberg, Marc. “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis.” International Security 10, no. 1 
(1985): 137–63. 
Trofimenko, Henry A. “Counterforce: Illusion of a Panacea.” International Security 5, no. 4 (1981): 28–48.  
Tyroler, Charles, II, ed. Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Washington: Potomac 
Books Inc, 1984. 
United States. Congressional Record, 96th Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980. 
United States. Consideration of Mr. Paul C. Warnke to Be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
and Ambassadorhearings Together with Individual Views, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 
Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1977. 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015071090396. 
United States. Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 
1979. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015082035935. 
United States. Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session. Washington: U.S. 
G.P.O., 1980. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100779465 
United States. Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, 
Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United 
States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, on S. 1210. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1977. 
https//catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/002941274. 
United States. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 1872 (H.R. 4040), Department of Defense Authorization for 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, and H.R. 2575 (S. 429), Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization 
for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-
Sixth Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1979. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4482631. 
United States. Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto 
(SALT II Treaty): Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-Sixth Congress, 
First Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1979. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b5107650. 
Untied States, Nuclear War Strategy: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-
Sixth Congress, Second Session, on Presidential Directive 59, September 16, 1980. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1981.  
United States. The SALT II Treaty: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-
Sixth Congress, First Session, on Ex. Y, 96-1. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1979. 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951p00679083s. 
United States. Warnke Nomination: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-
Fourth Congress, First Session, on Nomination of Paul C. Warnke to Be Director of the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, with the Rank of Ambassador during His Tenure of Service as Director, February 8 and 
9, 1977. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1977. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015078615542. 
United States, ed. The Presidential Campaign, 1976. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off, 1978. 
U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Carter Administration: A Chronology of Events, edited by Malcolm Byrne. Washington, 





Waltz, Kenneth N. “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.” The American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (1990): 731–
45.  
Warnke, Paul C. “Apes on a Treadmill.” Foreign Policy, no. 18 (1975): 12–29. 
Wood, B. Dan, and Jeffrey S. Peake. “The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting.” The American Political Science 
Review 92, no. 1 (1998): 173–84.  
 
